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information transmission, in which the beliefs and behavior of an investor affect others
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1 Introduction
The theory of capital market trading and pricing generally incorporates only a limited
form of social interaction and information transmission, wherein the beliefs and behavior
of an investor affect other investors only through market price. Furthermore, in standard
capital markets models, there is no localized contagion in beliefs and trading. Trading
behaviors do not move from one investor to other investors who are proximate (geo-
graphically, socially, professionally, or attentionally through connectivity in the news
media). Even most recent models of herding and information cascades in securities mar-
kets involve contagion mediated by market price, so that there are no networks of social
interaction.1 Furthermore, existing behavioral models of capital market equilibrium do
not examine how investors form naive popular ideas about how capital markets work
and what investors should do, and how such popular viewpoints spread.2
The theory of investment has incorporated social interactions somewhat more ex-
tensively, both in the analysis of increasing returns and path-dependence (see Arthur
(1989)), and in models of social learning about the quality of investment projects (dis-
cussed in Subsection 10.1). However, traditional models of corporate investment deci-
sions do not examine the process of contagion among managers of ideas about invest-
ment, financing, disclosure, and corporate strategy.
In reality, individuals often observe others’ behavior, and obtain information and
ideas through conversation and through print and electronic media. Individuals process
this information through both reasoning and emotional reactions, rather than perform-
ing the simple Bayesian or quasi-Bayesian updating of standard rational or behavioral
models. Popular opinions about investment strategies and corporate policies evolve over
time, partly in response to improvements in scientific understanding, and partly as a
result of psychological biases and other social processes. We are influenced by others
in almost every activity, and price is just one channel of influence. Such influence can
occur through rational learning (see, e.g., Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch (1992)) or through through irrational mechanisms (see Section 5), the lat-
ter including the urge to conform (or deviate), and contagious emotional responses to
stressful events.
This essay reviews theory and evidence about how beliefs about and behaviors in cap-
1However, DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2001) and Ozsoylev (2005) provide models of asset
pricing when there are interactions through social networks (see Section 9, which also discusses learning
in standard capital market models in greater depth).
2Insightful discussions of ‘popular models’ in finance are provided by Shiller (1990), Case and Shiller
(2003), and Shiller (2007a, 2007b).
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ital markets spread. We consider here decisions by investors about whether to participate
in the stock market and what stocks to buy; decisions by managers about investment,
financing, reporting, and disclosure; and decisions by analysts and media commentators
about what stocks to follow, what stocks to recommend, and what forecasts to make.
We also consider the effects of contagion on market prices, regulation, and welfare; and
policy implications.
We argue that in actual capital markets, in addition to learning from price, a more
personal form of learning is also important: from quantities (individual actions), from
performance outcomes, and from conversation—which conveys private information, ideas
about specific assets, and ideas about how capital markets work. Furthermore, we argue
that learning is often local: people learn more from others who are proximate, either
geographically or through professional or other social networks. We therefore argue
that social influence is central to economics and finance, and that contagion should be
incorporated into the theory of capital markets.
Several phenomena are often adduced as evidence of irrational conformism in capital
markets, such as anecdotes of market price movements without obvious justifying news;
valuations which, with the benefit of hindsight, seem like mistakes (such as the valuations
of U.S. internet stocks in the late 1990s, or of mortgage backed securities in recent years);
the fact that financial activity such as new issues, IPOs, venture capital financing, and
takeovers move in general or sector-specific waves (see, e.g., Ritter and Welch (2002),
Rau and Stouraitis (2008), and Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller (2007)). Observers are
often very quick to denounce alleged market blunders, and conclude that investors or
managers have succumbed to contagious folly.
There are two problems with such casual interpretations. First, sudden shifts do not
prove that there was a blunder. Large price or quantity movements may be responses
to news about important market forces. Second, even rational social processes can lead
to dysfunctional social outcomes.
With respect to the first point, market efficiency is entirely compatible with massive
ex post errors in analyst forecasts and in market prices, and with waves in corporate
transactions actions in response to common shifts in fundamental conditions.
With respect to the second point, the theory of information cascades (defined in
Section 2) and rational observational learning shows that some phenomena that seem
irrational can actually arise naturally in fully rational settings. Such phenomena in-
clude: (1) frequent convergence by individuals or firms upon mistaken actions based
upon little investigation and little justifying information; (2) fragility of social outcomes
with respect to seemingly small shocks; and (3) the tendency for individuals or firms
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to delay decision for extended periods of time and then, without substantial external
trigger, suddenly to act simultaneously. Furthermore, theoretical work has shown that
reputation-building incentives on the part of managers can cause convergent behavior
(item (1)), and has also offered explanations for why some managers may deviate from
the herd as well.
So care is needed in attributing either corporate event clustering or large asset price
fluctuations to contagion of irrational errors.3 In addition to addressing these issues, we
consider a shift in analytical point of view from the individual to the financial idea or
meme.
Ameme is a mental representation (such as an idea, proposition, or catchphrase) that
can be passed from person to person. Memes are therefore units of cultural replication,
analogous to the gene as a unit of biological heredity. The field of memetics views
cultural units as replicators, which are selected upon and change in frequency within
the population. Just as changes in gene frequency imply evolution within biologically
reproducing populations, changes in meme frequency imply cultural evolution. We argue
that certain investment theories have properties which make them better at replicating
(more contagious, or more persistent), leading to their spread and survival.
Furthermore, we argue that through cumulative evolution, financial memes combine
into coadapted assemblies which are more effective at replicating their constituent memes
than when the components operate separately. We call these assemblies financial ideolo-
gies. Memetics offers an intriguing analytical approach to understanding the evolution
of capital market (and other) popular beliefs and ideologies.
Only a few finance scholars have emphasized the importance of popular ideas about
markets (especially Robert Shiller, as mentioned in footnote 2), and there has been very
little formal analysis of the effects and spread of popular financial ideas. We argue here
that the analysis of thought contagion, the evolution of financial ideologies, and their
effects on markets is a missing chapter in modern finance, including behavioral finance.
Our focus is on contagion of beliefs or behavior, rather than defining contagion
as occurring whenever one party’ outcomes affect another’s.4 So we do not review
systematically the literature on contagion in bankruptcies or international crises in which
fundamental shocks and financial constraints cause news about one firm or region to
3Recent reviews of theory and evidence of both rational observational learning and other sources of
behavioral convergence in finance include Devenow and Welch (1996), Hirshleifer (2001), Bikhchandani
and Sharma (2001), and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002).
4If a flat tire in John’s car causes it to slam into a wall and then collide with Edna’s, the crash is
not caused by any transfer of beliefs or behavior from John to Edna. So even though bad new for John
has caused bad news for Edna, our focus is not on this sort of interaction per se.
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affect the payoffs of another.
Section 2 discusses learning and the general sources of behavioral convergence. Sec-
tion 3 discusses basic implications of rational learning and information cascades. Section
4 discusses basic principles of rational learning models and alternative scenarios of infor-
mation transfer by communication or observation. Section 5 examines psychological bias
and herding. Section 6 describes agency and reputation-based herding models. Section
7 describes theory and evidence on herding and cascades in security analysis. Section 8
describes herd behavior and cascades in security trading. Section 9 describes the price
implications of herding and cascading. Section 10 discusses herd behavior and cascad-
ing in firms’ investment, financing, and disclosure decisions. Section 11 examines the
popular models or memes about financial markets. Section 12 concludes.
2 Sources of Behavioral Convergence
An individual
,
s thoughts, feelings and actions are influenced by other individuals by
several means: verbal communication, observation of actions (e.g., quantities such as
supplies and demands), and observation of the consequences of actions (such as payoff
outcomes or market prices). Our interest is in convergence or divergence brought about
by direct or indirect social interactions (herding or dispersing). So we do not count
random groupings that arise solely by chance as herding, nor do we count mere clustering,
wherein individuals act in a similar way owing to the parallel independent influence of
a common external factor.
Following Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003a) we define herding/dispersing as any behavior
similarity or dissimilarity brought about by the direct or indirect interaction of individ-
uals.5 Possible sources include: (1) Payoff externalities (often called strategic comple-
mentarities or network externalities). For example, there is little point to participating
in Facebook unless many other individuals do so as well; (2) Sanctions upon deviants.
For example, critics of a dictatorial regime are often punished; (3) Preference interac-
tions. For example, a teenager may want an iPhone mainly because others talk about
the product, though a few mavericks may dislike a product for the same reason); (4)
Direct communication. This is just telling; however, just telling often lacks credibility);
and (5) Observational influence. This is an informational effect wherein an individual
5The interaction required in our definition of herding can be indirect. It includes a situation where
the action of an individual affects the world in a way that makes it more advantageous for another
individual to take the same action, even if the two individuals have never directly communicated. But
mere clustering is ruled out.
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observes and draws inferences from the actions of others or the consequences of those
actions.
We can distinguish an informational hierarchy and a payoff hierarchy in sources of
convergence or divergence (see also Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003a)). The most inclusive
category, herding/dispersing, includes both informational and payoff interaction sources
of herding as special cases.
Within herding/dispersing, the informational hierarchy is topped by observational
influence, a dependence of behavior upon the observed behavior of others, or the results
of their behavior. This influence may be either rational or irrational. A subcategory
is rational observational learning, which results from rational Bayesian inference from
information reflected in the behavior of others, or the results of their behavior. A further
refinement of this subcategory consists of information cascades, wherein the observation
of others (their actions, payoffs, or statements) is so informative that an individual’s
action does not depend on his own private signal.6
Imitation, broadly construed, includes both information cascades, and sub-rational
mechanisms that produce conformity with the behavior of others. A crucial benefit of
imitation is the exploitation of information possessed by others. When an insider is
buying, it may be profitable to buy even without knowing the detailed reason for the
purchase. There is also contagion in the emotions of interacting individuals (see, e.g.,
Barsade (2002)).
The benefits of imitation are so fundamental that the propensity to follow the be-
haviors of others has evolved by natural selection. Imitation has been extensively docu-
mented in many animal species, both in the wild and experimentally; among beast, fish,
and fowl; and in foraging and diet choices, selection of mates, selection of territories,
and means of avoiding predators.7 Indeed, Blackmore (1999) (e.g., pp. 74-81) suggests
that in early hominids there was strong selection for the ability to imitate, and that
the evolution of large brain size resulted from the need to be able to imitate complex
innovative behaviors.
In an information cascade, since an individual’s action choice does not depend upon
his signal, his action is uninformative to later observers. Thus, cascades are associ-
6See Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Welch (1992); Banerjee (1992) uses a different
terminology for this phenomenon.
7See, e.g., Gibson and Hoglund (1992), Giraldeau (1997), and Dugatkin (1992) Some authors use
highly restrictive definitions of imitation that require substantial understanding on the part of the
imitator. Under such definitions imitation is of course rare to non-existent among non-humans. The
evolution of mirror neurons in primates and humans (neurons that fire both when an individual takes
an action or observes the same action being performed by a different individual) also suggests the
importance of imitation.
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ated with information blockages (Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1992)), and, as we will see, with fragility of decisions (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch (1992)). Information blockages are caused by an informational externality: an
individual chooses his actions for private purposes with little regard to the potential
information benefit to others.8
A payoff interaction hierarchy provides a distinct hierarchy of types of herding or
dispersing that intersects with the categories in the information hierarchy. The first sub-
category of the catch-all herding/dispersing category is payoff and network externalities.
This consists of behavioral convergence or divergence arising from the effects of an
individuals actions on the payoffs to others of taking that action. For example, in the
classic analysis of the geometry of the selfish herd (Hamilton (1971)), prey animals form
herds as an unintended result of the selfish attempt by each to put others between itself
and predators. Direct payoff externalities have been proposed as an explanation for bank
runs (Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) since a depositor who
expects other depositors to withdraw has a stronger incentive to withdraw; and clumping
of stock trades by time (Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan
(1995)) or exchange (Chowdhry and Nanda (1991)), since uninformed investors have an
incentive to try to trade with each other instead of with the informed.
In several models, a desire for good reputation causes payoffs to depend on whether
individual behaviors converge.9 Thus, a subcategory of the payoff and network ex-
ternalities category is reputational herding and dispersion, wherein behavior converges
or diverges owing to the incentive for a manager to maintain a good reputation with
some observer. When individuals care about their reputations, reputational herding and
information cascades can easily both occur, since an individual who seeks to build a rep-
utation as a good decisionmaker may rely on the information of earlier decisionmakers
(Ottaviani and Sorenson (2000)).
8Chamley (2004b) and Gale (1996) review models of social learning and herding in general. For
presentation of information cascades theory and discussion of applications, tests, and extensions, see
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998, 2008a); Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (2008b)
provides an annotated bibliography of research relating to cascades.
9See Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Rajan (1994), Trueman (1994), Brandenburger and Polak (1996),
Zwiebel (1995), and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006).
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3 Rational Learning and Information Cascades: Ba-
sic Implications
If many individuals possess conditionally independent signals about which choice alter-
native is better, their information could be aggregated to determine the right decision
with arbitrarily high precision. Information cascades lead to information blockage, which
reduces the quality of later decisions. This blockage also has several other implications
for the contagion and stability of financial decisions, some of which hold even in rational
learning settings in which cascades proper do not occur.
Consider a sequence of individuals who face ex ante identical choices (e.g., invest-
ment projects), observe conditionally independent and identically distributed private
information signals, and who observe the actions but not the payoffs of predecessors.
Suppose that individual i is in a cascade, and that later individuals understand this.
Then individual i+1, having learned nothing from the choice of i, is in an information-
ally identical position to that of i. So i + 1 also makes the same choice regardless of
his private signal. By induction, this reasoning extends to all later individuals; the pool
of information implicit in the past actions of individuals stops growing when a cascade
begins. Indeed, in the simplest possible cascades setting, at this point the quality of
decisions never improves again.
When the assumptions are modified slightly, information is not blocked forever. If
individuals are not identical ex ante, then the arrival of an individual with deviant infor-
mation or preferences can dislodge a cascade. For example, an individual with a highly
precise signal will act independently, which conveys new information to later individu-
als. Furthermore, the arrival of public news, either spontaneously and independently of
past choices, or as payoff outcomes from past choices, can dislodge a cascade. The more
generic implication of the cascades approach is that the quality of decisions improves
much more slowly than would be the case under ideal information aggregation. Infor-
mation blockages can last for substantial periods of time; as we will see, at such times,
social outcomes are often fragile.
Information cascades are a special case of behavioral coarsening, defined as any sit-
uation in which an individual takes the same action for multiple signal values. When
there is behavioral coarsening, as in an information cascade an individuals action does
not fully convey his information signal to observers. So where a cascade causes (at least
temporarily) a complete information blockage, behavioral coarsening leads to partial
blockage. A surprising aspect of the theory of information cascades is that in a natural
setting the most extreme form of behavioral coarsening occurs.
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Since information is aggregated poorly in an information cascade, the quality of
decisions is reduced. Rational individuals who are in a cascade understand perfectly
well that the public pool of information implicit in predecessors’ actions is not very
precise. As a result, even a rather small nudge, such as a minor public information
disclosure, can cause a well-established and thoroughly conventional behavior pattern
to switch.
The arrival of a meaningful but inconclusive public information disclosure, paradox-
ically, can reduce the average quality the individuals’ decisions. Other things equal, a
given individual is better off receiving the extra information in the disclosure. However,
additional information will sometimes cause individuals to cascade earlier, aggregating
the information of fewer individuals. On balance, the public signal can induce a less-
informative cascade (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)). Of course, if highly
conclusive public information arrives, rational individuals will make very accurate deci-
sions. As Alexander Pope inimitably put it, “A little knowledge is a dangerous thing;
drink deep, or touch not the Pierian spring.”
The dangers of a little learning are created in other information environments as well.
In cascades models, the ability of individuals to observe payoff outcomes in addition to
past actions, or to make a noisy observation of past actions more precisely, can reduce
the average accuracy of decisions (Cao and Hirshleifer (1997, 2002)). Also, the ability to
learn by observing predecessors can make the decisions of followers noisier by reducing
their incentives to collect (perhaps more accurate) information themselves (Cao and
Hirshleifer (1997)). Another qualification to the benefits of information arrival about
payoff outcomes is that even if an unlimited number of signals arrive, the choices that
individuals can make may limit the resulting improvement in the information pool. For
example, there can be a positive probability that a mistaken cascade lasts forever (Cao
and Hirshleifer (2002)).
Often individuals choose not only whether to adopt or reject a project, but when to
do so. As a result, the timing and order of moves, which are given in the basic cas-
cades model, are endogenously determined. In models of the option to delay investment
choices10, there can be long periods with no investment, followed by sudden spasms in
which the adoption of the project by one firm triggers investment by others.
Most of the conclusions described above generalize to other social learning settings in
which cascades proper do not occur. Even when information blockage is not complete,
information aggregation is limited by the fact that individuals privately optimize rather
10See Chamley and Gale (1994); see also Hendricks and Kovenock (1989), Bhattacharya, Chatterjee,
and Samuelson (1986), Zhang (1997) and Grenadier (1999), and Chamley (2004a, 2004b).
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than taking into account their effects upon the public information pool. In particular,
there is a general tendency for information aggregation to be self-limiting. At first,
when the public pool of information is very uninformative, actions are highly sensitive
to private signals, so actions add a lot of information to the public pool.11 As the public
pool of information grows, individuals
,
actions become less sensitive to private signals.
In the simplest versions of the cascades model, behavioral coarsening occurs in an
all-or-nothing fashion, so that there is either full use of private signals, or no use of
private signals (as in Banerjee (1992), and the binary example of Bikhchandani, Hirsh-
leifer, and Welch (1992)). In more general settings, coarsening occurs by degrees, but
complete blockage eventually occurs (see the cascades model with multiple signal val-
ues of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)). In some settings, coarsening can
gradually proceed without ever reaching a point of complete blockage, though the prob-
ability that an individual uses his own signal asymptotes toward zero, a phenomenon
called ‘limit cascades’ (Smith and Sorenson (2000)). Or, if there is observation noise, the
public pool of information can grow steadily but more and more slowly (Vives (1993)).
So whether information channels become gradually or quickly clogged, and whether
the blockage is partial or complete, depends on the economic setting; but the general
conclusion that there can be long periods in which individuals herd upon poor decisions
is robust. Also, there tends to be too much copying or behavioral convergence; someone
who uses his own private information heavily provides a positive externality to followers,
who can draw inferences from his action.
Information cascades result from the individual’s private signal being overwhelmed
by the growing public pool of information. Such an outcome is impossible in a setting
where there is always a chance that an individual will receive a signal that is conclusive
or arbitrarily close to conclusive. However, if near-conclusive signals are rare, the public
information pool can grow very slowly, in which case ‘information cascade’ can be a
good approximation. Indeed, as the quality of the public information pool improves, the
likelihood that an individual will receive a signal powerful enough to oppose it declines.
To summarize, the information cascades model and some related rational learning
theories provide a few key general implications. The first, and central implication is
idiosyncrasy, or poor information aggregation. Cascades tend to emerge rapidly, so that
the signals of a relatively small number of early individuals dominates the behavior of
numerous followers.
11The addition can be directly through observation of past actions, or indirectly through observation
of consequences of past actions, as in public payoff information that results from new experimentation
on different choice alternatives.
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The second is fragility (fads). The blockage of information aggregation that is char-
acteristic of cascades makes behavior sensitive to small shocks. We are accustomed to
thinking of sensitivity to shocks as a rare circumstance, as when a flipped coin lands
on its side. The tendency of cascades to form suggests that real life is somewhat like
Hollywood thrillers in which the chase scene inevitably ends with the heros car teetering
precariously at the edge of a precipice.
The third is simultaneity (delay followed by sudden joint action). Such effects are
sometimes referred to as ‘chain reactions,’ ‘stampedes’ or ‘avalanches’. Endogenous order
of moves, heterogeneous preferences and precisions can exacerbate these problems.
The fourth is paradoxicality (adverse effects on decision accuracy or welfare of in-
formational improvements), and the fifth is path dependence (outcomes depending on
the order of moves or signal arrival). This implication is shared with models of payoff
interactions (e.g., Arthur (1989)).
4 What is Communicated or Observed?
We now describe in somewhat more detail alternative sets of assumptions in observa-
tional influence models and the implications of these differences.
4.1 Observation of Past Actions Only
Here we retain the assumption of the basic cascade model that only past actions are
observable, but consider several model variations.
1. Discrete, bounded, or gapped actions versus continuous unbounded actions
If the action space is continuous, unbounded, and without gaps, then an individual’s
action is always at least slightly sensitive to his private signal. Thus, actions always
remain informative, and information cascade never form. So for inefficient information
cascades to occur, actions must be discrete, bounded, or gapped. As discrete or bounded
action spaces become more extensive, cascades become more informative, approaching
full revelation (Lee (1993); see Gul and Lundholm (1995) and Vives (1993) for continuous
settings without cascades. Early cascade models were based upon action discreteness
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Welch (1992)).
The assumption that actions are discrete is often highly plausible. We vote for one
candidate or another, not for a weighted average of the two. A worker is hired or not
hired, and fired or not fired. A takeover bidder either does or does not seek control of a
target firm. Often alternative investment projects are mutually exclusive. Although the
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amount invested is often continuous, if there is a fixed cost the option of not investing
at all is discretely different from positive investment.
More broadly, one way in which the action set can be bounded is if there is a minimum
and maximum feasible project scale. If so, then when the public information pool is
sufficiently favorable a cascades at the maximum scale will form, and when the public
information pool is sufficiently adverse individuals will cascades upon the minimum
scale. Since there is always an option to reject a new project, investment has a natural
extreme action of zero. Thus, a lower bound of zero on a continuous investment choice
creates cascades of non-investment (Chari and Kehoe (2004)).12
Similarly, gaps can create cascades. For example, sometimes either a substantial
new investment, no change, or disinvestment is feasible, but fixed costs make a small
change clearly unprofitable. If so, then a cascade upon no change is feasible. Similarly,
a cascade of securities non-trading can form when there is a fixed cost of taking a long
or short position, or when there is a minimum trade size.
Even if the true action space is continuous, ungapped and unbounded, to the extent
that observers are unable to perceive or recall small fractional differences, the actions
of their predecessors effectively become either noisy or discrete. Where discretizing can
cause cascades and complete information blockage, noise slows down learning. In reality
there is always some effective discreteness or noise because real observers have finite
perceptual and cognitive powers. It is impossible for an observer to perceive arbitrarily
small differences in actions. Even if perception were perfect, it would also be impossible,
in the absence of infinite time and calculating capacity, to make use of arbitrarily small
observed differences in actions. Thus, for fundamental reasons there must be either
noise, perceptual/analytic discretizing, or both.13 However, cascades will tend to be
close to efficient unless choice options are sufficiently coarse.
If perceptual discretizing is very fine-graded, the outcome will still be very close to
full revelation. However, perception and analysis are coarse; consider, for example, the
tendency for people to round off numbers in memory and conversation. There is evidence
of clustering for retail deposit interest rates around integers, and that this is caused by
12Asymmetry between adoption and rejection of projects is often realistic and has been incorporated
in several social learning models of investment to generate interesting effects.
13In the absence of discretizing, repeated copying will gradually accumulate noise until the information
contained in a distant past action is overwhelmed. This overwhelming of analog signals by noise when
there is sequential replication is the reason that information must be digitized in the genetic code
of DNA, and in information that is sent (with repeated reamplification of signals) over the internet
(Dawkins (1995)).
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limited recall of investors (Kahn, Pennacchi, and Sopranzetti (1999)).
2. Observability of predecessors’ payoffs or signals
Even if individuals observe a subset of past signals, such as the past k signals, since in
general uncertainty remains, inefficient cascades can form. With regard to settings with
observation of past payoffs, inefficient cascades can form and with positively probability
last forever, because a cascade can lock into an inferior choice before sufficient trials
have been performed on the other alternative to persuade later individuals that this
alternative is superior (Cao and Hirshleifer (2002)). We discuss research on the effects
of observability of past payoffs and signals in more depth in Subsection 4.2.
3. Costless versus costly private information acquisition
Individuals often expend resources to obtain signals, but also often observe private
signals costlessly in the ordinary course of life. Most social learning models take the
costless route. Costs of obtaining signals can lead to little accumulation of information in
the social pool for reasons similar to cascades or herding models with costless information
acquisition. Individuals have less incentive to investigate or observe private signals if
the primary benefit of using such signals is the information that such use will confer
upon later individuals. (Burguet and Vives (2000) examine the conditions under which
complete learning occurs in a continuum model with investigation costs.) Indeed, if
the basic information cascades setting is modified to require individuals to pay a cost
to obtain their private signals, once a cascade is about to start an individual has no
reason to investigate. The outcome is identical to the basic cascades model, information
blockage. But the individual is acting without regard to his signal in only a degenerate
sense: he has not acquired any signal to regard to.
This suggests an extended definition of cascades that can apply to situations where
private signals are costly to obtain. Following Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003a), we define
an investigative cascade as a situation where either:
1. An individual acts without regard to his private signal; or,
2. Chooses not to acquire a costly signal, but he would have acted without regard to
that signal had he been forced to acquire it at the same level of precision that he
would have voluntarily acquired if he were unable to observe the actions or payoffs
of others.
Item 1 implies that all information cascades are also investigative cascades. Item 2
is simplest in the special case of a binary decision of whether or not to acquire an
information signal of exogenously given precision. Item 2 then reduces to the statement:
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the individual chooses not to acquire the signal, but if he were forced to acquire it
he would ignore its realization (because of the information he has already gleaned by
observing others).14
Investigative cascades may occur in the decisions by individuals to invest in different
countries. If investigation of each requires a fixed cost, then with a large number of
countries investors may cascade on non-investment (see the related analysis of Calvo
and Mendoza (2001)).
4. Observation of all past actions versus a subset or statistical summary of actions
Sometimes people can observe only the recent actions of others, a random sample
of actions, or can only observe the behavior of neighbors in some geographic or other
network.15 In such settings mistaken cascades can still form. For example, if only the
preceding k actions are observed, then a cascades may form within the first k individuals,
and then through chaining can extend indefinitely. Alternatively, individuals may only
be able to observe a statistical summary of past actions. Information blockage and
cascades are possible in such a setting as well (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1992)).16 A possible application is to the purchase of consumer products. Aggregate
sales figures for a product matter to future buyers because it reveals how previous buyers
viewed desirability of alternative products (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992),
Caminal and Vives (1999)).
5. Observation of past actions accurately or with noise
When past actions are observed with noise, social learning is still imperfect (Vives
(1993)), and (depending on the setting) cascades can still form (Cao and Hirshleifer
(1997)). In some scenarios a model in which individuals learn from price reduces in
effect to a basic social learning model with indirect observation of a noisy statistical
summary of the past trades of others.
6. Choice of timing of moves versus exogenous moves
Consider a setting in which individuals (firms) with private signals about project
quality have a choice about whether to invest or delay. In other words, firms decide when
to exercise their investment option. Then in equilibrium there is delay (Chamley and
14Item 2 further allows for the purchase of different possible levels of precision. The definition focuses
on the precision that the individual would select under informational autarky. If, under this precision,
the individual’s action does not depend on the realization, he is in an investigative cascade.
15Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001) analyze learning from the actions and payoff experiences of neighbors.
They show that this leads to convergence of behavior, and under some conditions efficient outcomes.
16With continuous actions and observation noise, as discussed above, the outcome may be slow
information aggregation rather than cascade; Vives (1993).
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Gale (1994)), because a firm that waits can learn from the actions of others. However,
if all were to wait, there would be no advantage to delay. Thus, in equilibrium firms
with favorable signals randomize strategies in deciding how long to delay before being
the first to invest. If only a few firms invest (by firms that have received favorable
signals), other firms infer that the state of the world is bad, and investment activity
ends. However, if many firms invest, this conveys favorable information, and a sudden
rush to invest by the other firms occurs (even firms with adverse signals). Indeed, in the
limit a period of little investment is followed by either a sudden surge in investment or
a collapse. Thus, the model illustrates simultaneity. In equilibrium cascades occur and
information is aggregated inefficiently.
Allowing for uncertainty about signal precision leads to a surprisingly simple out-
come (Zhang (1997)). Suppose that investors know the precisions only of their own
signals about project quality. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, those investors
whose favorable signals are less precise delay longer than those with more precise fa-
vorable signals; noisy information encourages waiting for corroboration. In equilibrium
there is delay until the critical investment date of the individual who drew the highest
precision is reached. Once he invests, other investors all immediately follow, though
investment may be inefficient. This sudden onset of investment illustrates simultaneity
in an extreme form.17
In settings with social learning, information blockages, delays in investment, periods
of sudden shifts in investment, and overshooting can occur, either with (Caplin and
Leahy (1994), Grenadier (1999)) or without (Caplin and Leahy (1993), Persons and
Warther (1997)) information cascades. These models share the broad intuitions that
informational externalities cause socially undesirable choices about whether and when
to invest. For example, Caplin and Leahy (1994) analyze information cascades in the
cancelation of investment projects when timing is endogenous. Individual cancelations
can trigger sudden crashes in the investments of many firms.
A natural application of social learning models is to the adoption of financial inno-
vations such as leveraged buyouts, which often seem to follow a boom and bust pattern.
Several authors have explained this pattern as resulting from managers adopting based
upon observation of the payoffs resulting from the repeated actions of other firms. In
the model of Persons and Warther (1997), there is a tendency for innovations to ‘end
17Chamley (2004a) finds that when individuals have different prior beliefs, there are multiple equilibria
that generate different amounts of public information. Imperfect information aggregation can also
occur in a rational expectations (simultaneous trading) modeling approach when information is costly
to acquire, asset prices are endogenous, and investment is a discrete decision which leads to price and
investment fluctuations (Beaudry and Gonzalez (2003)).
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in disappointment’ even though all participants are fully rational. Participants expect
to gain from extending the boom until disappointing news arrives. Related notions of
informational overshooting have been applied to real estate and stock markets (Zeira
(1999)).
7. Presence of an evolving publicly observable state variable
In models of cascades in the exercise of investment options, the trigger for exercise of
an investment option is often the exogenous continuous evolution of a publicly observable
state variable that affects the profitability of investment. In the model of Grenadier
(1999), eventually a small move in the state variable triggers a cascade of option exercise.
8. Stable versus stochastic hidden environmental variable
The attractiveness of market conditions for financial transactions such as raising cap-
ital vary greatly over time. When the underlying state of the world is stochastic but
unobservable, there can be fads wherein the probability that action changes is much
higher than the probability of a change in the state of the world (Bikhchandani, Hir-
shleifer, and Welch (1992)). Moscarini et al (1998) examine how long cascades can last
as the environment shifts. Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) consider an individual or firm
subject to memory loss about past signals but not actions. They describe the determi-
nants (such as environmental volatility) of whether memory loss causes inertia (a higher
probability of continuing past actions than if memory were perfect) or impulsiveness (a
lower probability).
9. Homogeneous versus heterogeneous payoffs
Individuals have different preferences, though this is probably more important in
non-financial settings. Suppose that different individuals value adoption differently. A
rather extreme case is opposing preferences or payoffs, so that under full information
two individuals would prefer opposite behaviors. If each individual’s type is observable,
different types may cascades upon opposite actions.
However, if the type of each individual is only privately known, and if preferences
are negatively correlated, then learning may be confounded— individuals do not know
what to infer from the mix of preceding actions they observe, so they simply follow their
own signals (Smith and Sorenson (2000)).
10. Endogenous cost of action: models with markets and endogenous price
We cover this topic separately in Section 9.
11. Single or repeated actions and private information arrival
Most models with private information involve a single irreversible action, and a single
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arrival of private information. In Chari and Kehoe (2004), in each period one investor
receives a private signal, and investors have a timing choice as to when to commit to
an irreversible investment. In equilibrium there are inefficient cascades. If individuals
take repeated, similar, actions and continue to receive non-negligible additional informa-
tion, actions will of course become very accurate. However, there can still be short-run
inefficiencies (e.g., Hirshleifer and Welch (2002)).
12. Discrete versus continuous signal values
Depending on probability distributions, with continuous signal values limit cascades
instead of cascades can occur (Smith and Sorenson (2000)). Of course, signal values are
often discrete. For example, the buyer of a consumer product may observe as a signal
of quality the number of ‘stars’ or ‘thumbs up’ the product has received by a reviewing
agency.18 Furthermore, the empirical and policy significance of the two predictions is
much the same. Having information arrives too late to be helpful for most individuals’
decisions is similar to one where information is completely blocked for some period (Gale
(1996)).
13. Exogenous rules versus endogenous contracts and institutional structure
Institutional rules and compensation contracts can be designed to manage herding
and information cascades in project choice (See Prendergast (1993), Khanna (1997), and
Khanna and Slezak (2000) (discussed below); see also Ottaviani and Sorenson (2001).)
4.2 Observation of Consequences of Past Actions
If vicarious learning can be used to aggregate the outcomes of many past trials of alterna-
tives, one might expect that society could overcome information blockages to converge
upon correct actions. However, as emphasized by Shiller (2000a), imperfect rational-
ity makes conversation a very imperfect aggregator of information. Biases induced by
conversation are therefore likely to be important for stock market behavior.
In formal modeling in an imperfectly rational setting (though not one designed specif-
ically to capture Shiller’s arguments), Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) find convergence
to efficient outcomes if people sample at least two predecessors. In their model, each
period a continuum of individuals try choice alternatives. Since each individual observes
18In practice, signal discreteness is rampant. Often the signal is information about whether something
does or does not fall into some discrete category. In voting for a U.S. presidential candidate, an individual
may take into account whether the individual currently is or is not Vice President. In deciding whether
or not to bet on a horse, a gambler may use as a signal whether or not it won the last race; he may not
know its exact time. When people obtain advice about a course of action, the advisor often recommends
an alternative with little elaboration.
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only a sample from past history, the shadow of history is not overwhelming. Particular
individuals fall into cascades, but different individuals make different choices. With a
continuum of individuals, society cannot get unanimously stuck on a bad choice. Infor-
mation about the payoffs from all possible options is continually regenerated, creating a
rich inventory of information to draw from.
A setting that is closer to the basic cascades model allows for observation of payoff
outcomes without assuming the infinitely rich inventory of past information. In Cao
and Hirshleifer (2002), there are two alternative project choices, each of which has
an unknown value-state. Payoffs are in general stochastic each period conditional on
the value-state. Rational individuals receive private signals and act in sequence, and
individuals can observe all past actions and project payoffs. Nevertheless, idiosyncratic
cascades still form. For example, a sequence of early individuals may cascade upon
project A, and its payoffs may become visible to all, perhaps revealing the value-state
perfectly. But since the payoffs of alternative B are still hidden, B may be the superior
project. Indeed, the ability to observe past payoffs can sometimes trigger cascades even
more quickly, reducing average decision quality and welfare—i.e., there is paradoxicality.
Intuitively, comparing the different settings, when only a sample of past actions and
outcomes is observed, decisions are improved, because the shadow of the past becomes
less overwhelming. When individuals are discrete, a sampling scenario makes it less
likely that society will unanimously fix upon a bad behavior, because there is more
opportunity for a few individuals who observe an unusual historical sample to choose
deviant actions that generate new corrective information. Bad cascades become less
frequent. In a sampling setting, having a greater number of individuals also reduces the
likelihood of chance unanimous fixation on a bad action. At the extreme of an infinite
number of individuals (as with a continuum), the risk of unanimous bad cascades can
be eliminated.
Potential industry entrants can learn indirectly about the actions of previous entrants
by observing market price, since this is affected by previous decisions. In the model of
Caplin and Leahy (1993), entrants do not possess any private information prior to entry.
Information problems slow the adjustment of investment to sectoral economic shocks.
4.3 Conversation, Media, and Advertising
A growing recent literature provides evidence suggesting that conversation in social net-
works conveys valuable information for financial decisions, and spreads corporate and
individual behaviors. Analysts who have old school ties to corporate managers at a
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company make better stock recommendations about the company (Cohen, Frazzini, and
Malloy (2008a)), mutual fund managers who have old school ties to corporate directors
are more willing to take a large position in the firm, and achieve better return per-
formance on their holdings (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008b)); and investors who
have stronger social interaction based on several measures (old college ties, sharing the
same profession, and geographical proximity) make more similar portfolio choices (Massa
and Simonov (2005)). Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2007) (discussed later) provide
evidence that option backdating spreads through board interlocks. Gupta-Mukherjee
(2007) finds that information relevant for achieving investment performance is transmit-
ted between fund managers (along fund-fund networks), and between fund managers and
companies in which they invest (along fund-company networks), where network linkage
is identified by geographical proximity.
Biases in conversation contribute to the spread of mistaken beliefs. Contributing to
this problem is a tendency for people to take statements that they hear from acquain-
tances and the news media at face value, rather than rationally discounting for cheap
talk. It is suggestive that discussion on stock message boards predict returns (Wysocki
(1998)), and that e-mail spam campaigns affect trading volume and price (Bo¨hme and
Holz (2006), Frieder and Zittrain (2007)).
News media activity can provide a measure of the extent to which information is
being conveyed to investors. Veldkamp (2006) provides a model of ‘frenzies
,
in emerging
equity markets in which media coverage rises, investors become better-informed about
asset payoffs and therefore face less risk, so that asset prices rise. She provides supporting
evidence.
Some individuals are more central than others in the social network that disseminates
financial ideas and information. The news media creates nodes of high influence. Recent
research has confirmed that the political opinions disseminated by media outlets affect
those of viewers (DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007)). There is every reason to believe that
media dissemination affects the financial ideologies of receivers as well.
Part of the effect of the media results from the sheer existence of high-influence nodes
in the social network, especially since media commentators may have different beliefs
from the public at large. Other effects arise from the self-interest of journalists and
media firms, which can also influence the viewpoints expressed or the stories selected for
reporting. This could bias stories because of journalists have a direct financial interest
in the firm they are reporting on, or could come from the benefits of reporting a story
that will grab the attention of the public (possibly at the expense of reporting more
important stories).
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Financial firms influence investors both by disclosures to the media, and through
advertising. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005a, 2005b) argue that audiences like to see
news that matches their beliefs, and are more likely to be persuaded by advertising
messages that fit their predispositions. Mullainathan and Shleifer provide evidence over
the course of the Internet bubble that in good times (after high market returns) finan-
cial firms emphasize in their advertisements how their products create opportunity for
investors, whereas in bad times advertisements emphasize how their products provide
safety.
5 Psychological Bias
Conformism allows individuals to obtain the benefit of the valuable ideas of others.
Several researchers have modeled the circumstances under which a propensity toward
conformism is favored by natural selection, and how conformism maintains cultural
differences between groups (Henrich and Boyd (1998), Boyd and Richerson (2005); see
also the discussion of Blackmore (1999)). Kuran (1987, 1989) analyzes the effects of
external pressures for and preferences for conformity; Bernheim (1994) analyzes the
consequences of a preference for conformity.
Even without a direct preference for conformity, psychological bias can promote
herding and cascades. Several models of herding or cascades assume either mechanistic
or imperfectly rational decisionmakers include Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) (rules
of thumb), Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) (‘hubris’ about the ability
to obtain information quickly), Bernardo and Welch (2001) (overconfidence about the
quality of information signals), Hirshleifer and Noah (1999) (misfits of several sorts),
and Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) (memory loss about past signals).
A reasonable imitation strategy for individuals is to base choices on the payoffs that
past adopters have received, and on the market shares of the choice alternatives, as in
the model of Smallwood and Conlisk (1979); see also Henrich and Boyd (2001). An
individual may observe a past sample of individuals, and take an action based upon the
actions and payoffs within this sample (Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995)).
If individuals use a diversity of decision rules (whether rational, quasi-rational, or
simple rules of thumb), then there will be greater diversity of action choices after ra-
tional individuals fall into a cascade. This action diversity can be informative, and can
break mistaken cascades (Bernardo and Welch (2001), Hirshleifer and Noah (1999)).
Consistent with Bernardo and Welch (2001), experiments show that individuals often
overweight private signals, breaking cascades (Goeree, Palfrey, Rogers, and McKelvey
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(2007)).
There are other possible directions to take imperfect rationality and social learning.
Evidence of emotional contagion within groups suggests that there may be merit to
popular views that there are contagious manias or fads in speculative markets (see also
Shiller (2000b), Lynch (2000), and Lux (1995)). However, there are rational models of
bubbles and crashes that do not involve herding (see, e.g., the agency/intermediation
model of Allen and Gale (2000a), and the review of Brunnermeier (2001)).
In security market settings, the assumption that the variance of aggregate noise
trading is large enough to influence prices non-negligibly (as in the seminal paper of
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and subsequent models of exogenous
noise) implicitly reflects an assumption that individuals are irrationally correlated in
their trades. This could be a result of herding (social interaction), or merely a common
irrational influence of some noisy variable on individuals’ trades. Park and Sgroi (2008)
find evidence of irrational herding in an experimental security market.
We and others have argued that limits to investor attention are important for financial
disclosure, financial reporting, and capital markets.19 Such limits to attention may
pressure individuals to herd or cascade despite the availability of a rich set of public
and private information signals (beyond past actions of other individuals). A related
issue is whether the tendency to herd or cascade greater when the private information
that individuals receive is hard to process (cognitive constraints and the use of heuristics
for hard decision problems were emphasized by Simon (1955); in the context of social
influence, see Conlisk (1996)). In this regard, there is evidence that apparent herd
behavior by analysts is greater for diversified firms, for which the task that analysts face
is more difficult (Kim and Pantzalis (2000)).20
6 Reputation, Contracts, and Herding
The seminal paper on reputation and herd behavior, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) cap-
tures the insight of John Maynard Keynes that “it is better to fail conventionally than to
succeed unconventionally.” Consider two managers who face identical binary investment
choices. Managers may have high or low ability, but neither they nor outside observers
know which. Observers infer the ability of managers from whether their investment
19See the review of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002), and the models of Hirshleifer and Teoh
(2003b, 2004), Peng and Xiong (2006), and Dellavigna and Pollet (2006, 2007).
20There are also models with mechanistic agents and the relation of herd behavior to price distribu-
tions (see, e.g., Cont and Bouchaud (2000)).
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choices are identical or opposite, and then update based upon observing investment
payoffs. Managers are paid according to observers’ assessment of their abilities. It is
assumed that high ability managers will observe identical signals about the investment
project, whereas low ability managers observe independent noise.
There is a herding equilibrium in which the first manager makes the choice that his
signal indicates, whereas the second manager always imitates this action regardless of
his own signal. If the second manager were to follow his own signal, observers would
correctly infer that his signal differed from the first manager, and as a result they would
infer that both managers are probably of low quality. In contrast, if he takes the same
choice as the first manager, even if the outcome is poor, observers conclude that there
is a fairly good chance that both managers are high quality and that the bad outcome
occurred by chance.
During bad times, the necessity for even a good firm to take actions indicative of
poor performance can create an opening for a firm that has a choice to take such actions
without severe reputational penalty. Rajan (1994) considers the incentive for banks
with private information about borrowers to manage earnings upward by relaxing their
credit standards for loans, and by refraining from setting aside loan-loss reserves. In a
bad aggregate state, even the loans of high ability managers do poorly, so observers are
more tolerant of a banker that sets aside loan-loss reserves. Thus, a set-aside of reserves
triggers by a bank triggers set-asides by other banks. This simultaneity in the actions
of banks is somewhat analogous to the delay and sudden onset of information cascades
in the models Zhang (1997) and Chamley and Gale (1994).
Furthermore, Rajan shows that banks tighten credit in response to declines in the
quality of the borrower pool. Thus banks amplify shocks to fundamentals. Rajan pro-
vides evidence from New England banks in the 1990s of such delay in increasing loan
loss reserves, followed by sudden simultaneous action.
It is often argued that stock market analysts have a reputational incentive to herd
in their forecasts of future earnings. The classic model along these lines is Trueman
(1994), which we cover in the next section. One of his findings is that analysts have an
incentive to make forecasts biased toward the market’s prior expectation. Brandenburger
and Polak (1996) show that a firm or set of firms with superior information can have
a reputational incentive to make investment decisions consistent with the prior belief
that observers have about which project choice is more profitable—a sort of herding
of managers upon outsiders rather than each other. There can also be an incentive
for subordinate managers to make recommendations consistent with the prior beliefs of
their superiors (Prendergast (1993)).
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In contrast with the model of Scharfstein and Stein, in which it is better to fail as
part of the herd than to succeed as a deviant, in Zwiebel (1995) it is always best to
succeed. Herding (and anti-herding) is caused by the fact that a manager’s success is
measured relative to others sometimes causes herding. The first premise of the model is
that there are common components of uncertainty about managerial ability. As a result,
observers exploit relative performance of managers to draw inferences about differences
in ability. The second premise is that managers are averse to the risk of being exposed as
having low ability (perhaps because the risk of firing is nonlinear). For a manager who
follows the standard behavior, the industry benchmark can quite accurately filter out
the common uncertainty. This makes following the industry benchmark more attractive
for a fairly good manager than a poor one, even if the innovative project stochastically
dominates the standard project. The alternative of choosing a deviant or innovative
project is highly risky in the sense that it creates a possibility that the manager will do
very poorly relative to the benchmark.21
However, in Zwiebel’s model a very good manager can be highly confident of beating
the industry benchmark even if he chooses a risky, innovative project. If this project is
superior, it pays for him to deviate. Thus, intermediate quality managers herd, whereas
very good or very poor managers deviate. Zwiebel’s approach suggests that under some
circumstances portfolio managers may herd by reducing the risk of their portfolios rel-
ative to a stock market or other index benchmark, but under others may intentionally
deviate from the benchmark. Several papers pursue these and related issues, such as
optimal contracting, in detail (see, e.g., Maug and Naik (1996), Gumbel (1998), Hud-
dart (1999), and Hvide (2001)). Sciubba (2000) provides a model of herding by portfolio
managers in relation to past performance.
Institutions and/or compensation schemes can be designed to address or exploit
managerial incentives to engage in information cascades or making choices to match an
observer’s priors (Prendergast (1993) [discussed above], Khanna (1997), Khanna and
Slezak (2000)).22 Khanna (1997) examines the optimal compensation scheme when
managers have incentives to cascade in their investment decisions. In his model, a
manager who investigates potentially has an incentive to cascade upon the action of an
earlier manager. Furthermore, a manager may delay investigation about the profitability
21Relative wealth concerns can also induce investment herding (DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2007)).
Alternative explanations for corporate conservatism include the reputational models of Hirshleifer and
Thakor (1992) and Prendergast and Stole (1996), and the memory-loss approach of Hirshleifer and
Welch (2002).
22Grant, King, and Polak (1996) review the effects of informational externalities in firms when man-
agers have share price incentives.
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of investment in the expectation of gleaning information more cheaply by observing
the behavior of the competitor. Khanna describes optimal contracts that address the
incentives to investigate and to cascade, and the implications for compensation and
investments across different industries.
Within the firm, the incentive to cascade upon the recommendations of other man-
agers makes it hard to motivate managers to make meaningful recommendations. In
the model of Khanna and Slezak (2000), cascading among managers reduces the qual-
ity of project recommendations and choices. This is a drawback of a regime of ‘team
decisions,’ in which managers make decisions sequentially and observe each others’ rec-
ommendations. Incentive contracts that eliminate cascades may be too costly to be
desirable for the shareholders. A hub-and-spokes hierarchical structure where managers
independently report recommendations to a superior eliminates cascades, but requires
superiors to incur costs of monitoring subordinates to prevent communication. Thus,
under different conditions the optimal organizational form can be either teams or hier-
archy.
7 Security Analysis
7.1 Investigative Herding
Most of the literature on information cascades in securities markets has focused on direct
cascades in trading (Section 8), and elucidates the conditions under which such cascades
can or cannot form. However, even in those scenarios in which direct cascades in trading
cannot form, cascades of investigation can form before any trading has occurred. Such
cascades still affect trading behavior.
Consider a sequence of individuals deciding whether to access a costly source of
private information, such as an investment newsletter. If individuals can observe the
decisions of predecessors (directly, through conversation, or through circulation data),
then an information cascade can form of acquisition of this information. The cascade
may eventually be broken owing to a negative externality: when more investors have
access to an information signal, its value goes down.
Such cascades are one case of what we call investigative herding. Positive payoff
externalities can also create investigative herding (though information still plays an
important role). The analysis of Brennan (1990) was seminal in illustrating a source
of positive payoff externalities in the analysis of securities, and how this can create
investigative herding. He provides an overlapping generations model in which private
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information about a security is not necessarily reflected in market price the next period.
This occurs in a given period only if a pre-specified number of individuals had acquired
the signal. Thus, the benefit to an investor of acquiring information about an asset can
be low if no other investor acquires the information. However, if a group of investors
tacitly coordinate on acquiring information, then the investors who obtain information
first do well.
This insight raises the question of whether investigative herding can occur in settings
with greater resemblance to standard models of security trading and price determination.
In the model of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), investors with exogenous short
horizons find it profitable to herd by investigating the same stock. In so doing they are,
indirectly able to effect what amounts to a tacit manipulation strategy. When they buy
together the price is driven up, and then they sell together at the high price. Thus,
herding even on ‘noise’ (a spurious uninformative signal) is profitable.
However, even in the absence of opportunities for herding there is a potential in-
centive for individuals, acting on their own, to effect such manipulation strategies. If
individuals are allowed to trade to ‘arbitrage’ such manipulation opportunities, it is not
clear that such opportunities can in equilibrium persist. This raises the question of
whether there are incentives for herding per se rather than for herding as an indirect
means of manipulation.23
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) examine the security analysis and
trading decisions of risk averse individuals, where investigation of a security leads some
individuals to receive information before others. They find a tendency toward herding.
The presence of investigators who receive information late confers an obvious benefit
upon those who receive information early- the late informed drive the price in a direction
favorable to the early-informed. But by the same token, the early-informed push the
price in a direction unfavorable to the late-informed.
The key to the herding result is that the presence of the late-informed allows the
early-informed to unwind their positions sooner. This allows the early-informed to reduce
the extraneous risk they would have to bear if, in order to profit on their information,
they had to hold their positions for longer. This risk-reduction that the late-informed
confer upon the early informed is a genuine ex ante net benefit—it is not purely at the
expense of the late informed.24 Overconfidence about the ability to become informed
23Since holding a speculative position a long time is risky, something akin to short horizons can arise
endogenously. Thus, prices reflect private long-term information very imperfectly (Dow and Gorton
(1994)).
24Related tradeoffs can also cause herding in the choice of whether to study short-term or long-term
information about a stock (Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996)). A different approach to strategic
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early further encourages herding in this model; each investor expects to come out the
winner in the competition to study the ‘hot’ stocks.
7.2 Herd Behavior by Stock Analysts and other Forecasters
We expect rational forecasts to glean information from the forecasts of others, causing
herding. A further question is whether, owing to reputational effects or irrationality,
herding causes biased forecasts or recommendations.
Several studies provide evidence of herding in various kinds of forecasts, such as
forecasts of the Japanese macro-economy (Ashiya and Doi (2001)). If herding occurs
for reputational reasons, other things equal we would expect forecasters to tilt their
forecasts toward the most accurate among other forecasters. Ehrbeck and Waldmann
(1996) show that the pattern of repeated forecasts over time made by accurate (low
mean-squared-error) forecasters tend to differ (e.g., smaller forecast revisions) from that
of less accurate forecasters. Inconsistent with a rational reputational approach, in their
tests economic forecasters bias their forecasts in directions characteristic of less accurate
forecasters. Nevertheless, most analytical literature on stock market analysts has focused
on rational reputational reasons for bias.
Analyst earnings forecasts are biased (see Givoly and Lakonishok (1984), Brown,
Foster, and Noreen (1985)). Forecasts are generally optimistic in the U.S. and other
countries, especially at horizons longer than one year (see, e.g. Capstaff, Paudyal,
and Rees (1998)). More recent evidence indicates that analysts’ forecasts have become
pessimistic at horizons of 3 months or less before the earnings announcement (see, e.g.,
Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004)).
A concern for reputation can pressure analysts to herd. The compensation received
by analysts is related to its ranking in a poll by Institutional Investor about the best
analysts (Stickel (1992)). Furthermore, analysts whose forecasts are less accurate than
peers are more likely to experience job turnover (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999)).25
These findings suggests that analysts may have an incentive to adjust their forecasts
to maintain good reputations for high accuracy. Less experienced analysts are more
likely to be terminated for ‘bold’ (deviant) forecasts that deviate from the consensus
forecast than are experienced ones. This seems to place a higher pressure to herd on
those analysts for whom uncertainty about ability is greater (Hong, Kubik, and Solomon
complementarity in information acquisition with short-term trading is provided by Chamley (2007).
25The importance of relative evaluation supports the premise of reputational models of herding.
However, Mikhail et al find no relation between either absolute or relative profitability of an analyst’s
recommendations and probability of turnover.
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(2000)). Clement and Tse (2005) finds that analysts with greater prior accuracy and
experience are more likely to make ‘bold’ (deviant) forecasts (see Trueman (1994) below),
and that herding forecast revisions tend to be less accurate than bold forecast revisions.
True herding (issuing forecasts that are biased toward those announced by previous
analysts—a form of social interaction between analysts) should be distinguished from
issuing forecasts that are biased toward prior earnings expectations. In the reputation
model of Trueman (1994), both occur. In his analysis, an analyst has a greater tendency
to herd if he is less skillful at predicting earnings—it is less costly to sacrifice a poor
signal than a good one.
When analysts herd, a shift in forecast by one analyst stimulates response by others.
A challenge for testing this prediction and for evaluating whether the response is appro-
priate, is that it is hard to show causality. Changes in consensus analyst forecasts are
indeed positively related to subsequent revisions in analysts’ forecasts (Stickel (1990)),
which is potentially consistent with herd behavior. This relationship is weaker for the
high-precision analysts who are ranked in an elite category by Institutional Investor
magazine than for analysts who are not. Thus, it appears that analysts ranked as elite
are less prone to herding than those that are not, consistent with the prediction of the
Trueman model.
Experimental evidence involving experienced professional stock analysts has also
supported the model (Cote and Sanders (1997)). Cote and Sanders report that these
forecasters exhibited herding behavior. Furthermore, the amount of herding was related
to the forecasters’ perception of their own abilities and their motivation to preserve or
create their reputations.
Two papers that provide methodologies for estimating the degree of herding versus
exaggeration of differences (dispersing, the opposite of herding) by analysts in the field
(Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt, Campello, and Kutsoati (2006)) find dispersing. These
studies indicate that analysts on average exaggerate their differences. Zitzewitz also finds
that analysts under-update their forecasts in response to public information, indicating
an overweighting of prior private information. This evidence is supportive of overcon-
fidence by analysts in their own private signals, or with reputational models in which
some individuals intentionally diverge (e.g., Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Ottaviani
and Sorensen (2006)).
It is also often alleged that analysts herd in their choice of what stocks to follow.
There is high variation in analyst coverage of different firms (Bhushan (1989)); this does
not prove that herding is the source of this variation. Rao, Greve, and Davis (2001)
provide evidence that analysts tend to follow each other in initiating coverage on a
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stock, and provide a cascades interpretation.
There are also allegations that analysts herd inappropriately in their stock recom-
mendations. The evidence of Welch (2000) indicates that revisions in the buy and sell
stock recommendations of a security analyst are positively related to revisions in the
buy and sell recommendations of the next two analysts. Welch traces this influence to
short-term information, identified by estimating the ability of the revision to predict
subsequent returns.26
Welch also finds that analysts’ choices are correlated with the prevailing consensus
forecast. The ‘influence’ of the consensus on later analysts is not stronger when it is a
better predictor of subsequent stock returns. In other words, the evidence is consistent
with analysts herding even upon consensus forecasts that aggregate information poorly.
This is consistent with either agency effects such as reputational herding, or imperfect
rationality on the part of analysts. Finally, Welch finds an asymmetry, that the tendency
to herd is stronger when recent returns have been positive (‘good times’) and when the
consensus is optimistic. He speculates that this could lead to greater fragility during
stock market booms, and the occurrence of crashes.
A different way to test for the effects of herding in recommendations is to examine
the stock price reactions to new recommendations that are close to versus farther from
the consensus forecast (Jegadeesh and Kim (2007)). Such tests indicate that stock
price reactions are stronger when the new recommendation deviates farther from the
consensus. Assuming that the market is efficient, this suggests that analysts herd (and
that investors appropriately adjust for this fact in setting price).
There is mixed evidence of herding in recommendations of investment newsletters.
Jaffe and Mahoney (1999) report only weak evidence of herding by newsletters in their
recommendations over 1980-96. However, Graham (1999) develops and tests an explicit
reputation-based model of the recommendations of investment news letters, in the spirit
of Scharfstein and Stein (1990). He finds that analysts with better private information
are less likely to herd on the market leader, Value Line investment survey. This finding
is consistent with both the reputational herding and information cascades approaches.
8 Herd Behavior and Cascades in Security Trading
Some sociologists have emphasized that the ‘weak ties’ of liaison individuals, who connect
partly-separated social networks, are important for spreading behaviors across networks
26This could reflect cascading, or could be a clustering effect wherein the analysts commonly respond
to a common information signal.
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(Granovetter (1973)). A recent literature in economics has examined the strength of
peer-group effects in a number of different contexts (see, e.g., Weinberg, Reagan, and
Yankow (2004), and the review of Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000)).
Questionnaire/survey evidence indicates that word-of-mouth communications are im-
portant for the trading decisions of both individual and institutional investors (Shiller
and Pound (1989)). Employees are influenced by the choices of coworkers in their deci-
sions of whether to participate in different employer-sponsored retirement plans (Duflo
and Saez (2002, 2003), Madrian and Shea (2000)). Furthermore, there is both modern
and historical evidence suggesting that social interactions between individuals affects de-
cisions about equity participation and other financial decisions.27 There is also evidence
of clustering in the trading of institutional managers. Mutual fund managers located
in a given city tend to be more correlated in their purchases or sales of stocks than
managers located in different cities (Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005)), possibly owing to
access to similar information sources.
8.1 Evidence on Herding in Securities Trades
8.1.1 Herding on Endorsements
According to the information cascades theory, endorsements can be extremely influential
if the endorser has a reputation for accuracy, and if the endorsement involves an actual
informative action by the expert. This could take the form of knowing that the expert
took a similar action (buying a stock), but could also involve the expert investing his
reputation in the stock by recommending it.
Empirically, the choice by a big-five auditor, top-rank investment bank, or venture
capitalist to invest its reputation in certifying a firm influences investor favorably toward
the firm.28 Just as shopping mall developers use ‘anchor’ stores to attract other stores,
according to McGee (1997) some investment banks have been using the names of well-
known investors as ‘anchors’ to attract other investors. There are many examples of
influential investors, some more benign than others. Some investors are influenced in
cold-calls by brokers by statements that famous investors such as Warren Buffett are
holding a stock (see Lohse (1998)). The publication of news that Buffett has purchased
a stock is associated with a positive stock price reaction which is on average greater
27See Kelly and O’Grada (2000), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2007),
Shive (2008), and Brown, Ivkovich, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008).
28See the model of Titman and Trueman (1986), and the evidence of Beatty and Ritter (1986), Beatty
(1989), Simunic (1991), and Michaely and Shaw (1995).
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than 4% (Martin and Puthenpurackal (2008)).29 Stock prices react to the news of the
trades of insiders (e.g., Givoly and Palmaon (1985)). Such trades provide information,
and this price evidences indicates that observers use it to adjust their demand for stock.
Investing in human capital is a form of endorsement; the signing of a famous name
to a management team affects how a startup is perceived by investors. Investors are
sometimes irrationally influenced by famous but incompetent analysts—stock market
‘gurus’. This may involve a limited attention/availability effect wherein investors use an
analyst’s visibility as an indicator of ability. A would-be guru can exploit the flaws of
this heuristic by using even outlandish publicity stunts to gain notoriety; see, e.g., the
description of Joseph Granville’s career in Shiller (2000b).
As discussed earlier, investors are also influenced by private conversations with peers.
There is also evidence that investors are influenced by implicit endorsements, as with
default settings for contributions in 401(k) plans; see Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)
and Madrian and Shea (2000).
8.1.2 Herding on Trades
A key challenge for empirical tests for herding is to show that there is actual social
interaction or strategic complementarity, rather than clustering based solely on some
external causal factor (Manski (1993)). If an external factor shifts the cost or benefit of
some action (such as buying a stock) for a group of investors, then their trades will shift
together even if there is no social interaction.
Several lines of attack have been used to identify herding in financial markets. One
approach is to control carefully for variables that jointly affect the behavior of different
individuals (see, e.g., Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Ikaheimo (2008) on demand for cars; for
a general analysis of econometric issues in measuring social interaction, see Brock and
Durlauf (2000)). Using an instrumental variable approach to identify a causal relation
between the decisions of neighbors to participate in the stock market, Brown, Ivkovich,
Smith, and Weisbenner (2008) show that the effect is stronger in communities with
stronger social interactions. To identify the effects of local peers on an individuals’ stock
ownership (as distinguished from the effects of other factors that may affect all local
individuals), Brown et al focus on the effects of stock ownership by the non-local parents
of the local peers. Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2007) provide evidence that investors are
29After news that Warren Buffett had bought approximately 20% of the 1997 world silver output,
according to The Economist (1998), silver prices were “soaring.” When Buffett’s filings reporting his
increased shareholding in American Express and in PNC Bank became public, these shares rose by
4.3% and 3.6% respectively (Obrien and Murray (1995)).
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influenced in their stock trading behavior by the behavior of neighbors. Ng and Wu
(2006) provide relatively direct evidence of social influence in trades through word-of-
mouth communication in trading rooms in China.
If higher population density encourages social interaction, then density should affect
volume of trading (see the tests of Eleswarapu (2004)). Survey evidence indicates that
households that are more social or attend church participate more in the stock market
(Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004)), suggesting that participation is contagious. Shive
(2008) measures the opportunity for investors who own a stock to ‘infect’ non-holders in
a municipality by the product of the number of owners and the number of non-owners of
the stock. This measure is motivated by models from epidemiology which contain such
product terms. Using data from the Finland stock market on investor trading of the 20
most actively traded stocks, she finds that this product term is a predictor of trading in
the stock, consistent with social interactions affecting trading.
A few studies examine natural or artificial experiments which rule out the possibility
of an omitted influence. There is evidence of the peer effect of roommates on grade
point average and on decisions to join fraternities even when roommates are assigned
randomly (Sacerdote (2001)), which avoids the possible bias. Also, a growing literature
starting with Anderson and Holt (1996) has confirmed learning by observing actions,
and the existence of information cascades in the experimental laboratory.30 Consistent
with cascades, female guppies tend to reverse their mate choices in experiments where
they observe other females choosing different males (Dugatkin and Godin (1992)).
The causation issue is especially tricky in financial market trading tests because
of the market clearing condition as mediated by price. Correlation in trades within a
group of investors (conditioned upon past price movements in some tests) may merely
reflect herding (or other reasons for correlated trading) by some other investor group of
investors. For example, individual investors buying and selling in tandem could result
from some other group of investors such as mutual funds buying and selling in tandem,
influencing prices. If individual investors supply liquidity to institutions by trading
as contrarians in response to price movements (as found by Kaniel, Saar, and Titman
(2008)), they will tend to trade together.
If there are only two groups of traders, then by market clearing, herding by one group
of traders automatically implies correlation in the trades of the other group, even if there
be no interactions and no strategic complementarities between members of this other
group. Thus, to verify that a group is truly herding, it is crucial either to control for
30See also Hung and Plott (2001), Anderson (2001), Sgroi (2003) and Celen and Kariv (2004, 2005).
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price, or else to find some other way to verify the causality of the behavioral convergence.
A number of alternative measures of herding in trading behavior have been devel-
oped in papers on the behavior of institutional investors.31 Bikhchandani and Sharma
(2001) critically review alternative empirical measures of herding. Griffiths et al (1998)
find increased similarity of behavior in successive trades for securities that are traded
in an open outcry market rather than a system trading market on the Toronto stock
exchange, consistent with the possibility of imitation-trading raised by the evidence
of Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) provide evidence
consistent with herding by individuals and institutions.
Institutional investors constitute a large fraction of all investors. By market-clearing
it is impossible for all investors to be buyers or sellers. So although testing for herding
by such a large group is not unreasonable, it is helpful to examine finer subdivisions
of investors. Earlier evidence consistent with mutual fund herding was provided by
Friend, Blume, and Crockett (1970), who found, during a quarter in 1968, that funds
tended to follow the investment decisions made in the previous quarter by successful
funds. However, in a sample of mutual funds and bank trusts from 1968-9, Kraus and
Stoll (1972) attribute the trade imbalances they find in stocks to chance rather than
correlated trading.
More recent studies find evidence of correlated trading by different categories of
institutional investors, especially involving small firms. Whether this reflects actual
herding by (interaction among) institutions, common responses to common information
signals, or correlated trading in response to herding by individual or other institutional
investors is unclear. There is evidence that the trades of individual investors as a group
are correlated (Kumar and Lee (2006)), and evidence from trading in China of stronger
correlation in trades among individual investors who are geographically close (Feng and
Seasholes (2004)).32
Fund managers who are doing well tend to lock in their gains toward end of the year
by indexing the market, whereas funds that are doing poorly deviate from the benchmark
in order to try to overtake it (Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and
Ellison (1997)). Chevalier and Ellison (1999) identify possible compensation incentives
31See, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), and
Wermers (1999).
32Several papers on trading by institutional investors provides evidence of correlation in trades (re-
ferred to as ‘herding’ in this literature with no clear implication of interaction between traders), and
provide many interesting stylized facts (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1995), Kodres and Pritsker (1997), Wermers (1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), and Sias
(2004)).
31
for younger managers to herd by investing in popular sectors, and find empirically that
younger managers choose portfolios that are more ‘conventional’ and which have lower
non-systematic risk.
There is evidence suggesting that mutual fund herding affects prices (Brown, Wei,
and Wermers (2008)). Mutual funds tend to buy stocks that have experienced consen-
sus analyst upgrades and to sell stocks with consensus downgrades. Brown, Wei and
Wermers find that the upgraded stocks at first achieve superior return performance,
but subsequently underperform, suggestive of either reputational or imperfectly rational
herding.
8.2 Financial Market Runs and Contagion
There is a problem with provision of public goods because the contributions of one party
confer positive externalities upon others. When there are strategic complementarities
in contributions, there is the possibility of a
.
run,’ possibly triggered by information
disclosure, in which contributions suddenly shrink to zero or some other low level. As a
result, unbiased disclosure can reduce welfare (Teoh (1997)).
The most familiar form of financial market run is the bank run. There is a negative
payoff externality in which withdrawal by one depositor, or the refusal of a creditor to
renegotiate a loan, reduces the expected payoffs of others. Bernardo and Welch (2004)
model how financial market runs can arise endogenously among investors in a stock
because of illiquidity.
A traditional view is that bank runs are due to ‘mob psychology’ or ‘mass hysteria’
(see the references discussed in Gorton (1988)). At some point economists may revisit
the role of emotions in causing bank runs or ‘panics,’ and more generally causing multiple
creditors to refuse to finance distressed firms. Such an analysis will require attending to
evidence from psychology about how emotions affect judgments and behavior.
The main existing models of bank runs and of financial distress are based upon full
rationality (for reviews of models and evidence about bank runs, see, e.g., Calomiris and
Gorton (1991) and Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) Section 5.2). The externality in
withdrawals can lead to multiple equilibria involving runs on the bank or firm, or to bank
runs triggered by random shocks to withdrawals (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).
This of course does not preclude the possibility that there is also an informational
externality.
The informational hypothesis (e.g., Gorton (1985, 1988)) holds that bank runs result
from information that depositors receive about the condition of banks’ assets. When a
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distressed firm seeks to renegotiate its debt, the refusal of one creditor may make others
more skeptical. Similarly, if some bank depositors withdraw their funds from a troubled
bank, others may infer that those who withdrew had adverse information about the value
of the bank’s illiquid assets, leading to a bank run (see, e.g., Chari and Jagannathan
(1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988)).
Since the decision to withdraw is bounded (an investor can only withdraw up to the
amount of his deposit), bank runs can be modeled as information cascades. There is a
payoff interaction as well. However, at the start of the run, when only a few creditors have
withdrawn, the main effect may be the information conveyed by the withdrawals rather
than the reduction in the bank’s liquidity. Furthermore, if asset values are imperfectly
correlated, cascades can pass contagiously between banks and cause mistaken runs even
in banks that could have remained sound; (on information and contagious bank runs,
see Gorton (1988), Chen (1999), and Allen and Gale (2000b)).
There is evidence of geographical contagion between bank failures or loan-loss reserve
announcements and the returns on other banks (Aharony and Swary (1996) and Dock-
ing, Hirschey, and Jones (1997)). This suggests that bank runs could be triggered by
information rather than being a purely non-informational (multiple equilibria, or effects
of random withdrawal) phenomenon.33 There is also evidence of contagion effects in a
sample of U.S. bank failures during the period 1930-32 (Saunders and Wilson (1996)).
On the other hand Calomiris and Mason (1997) find that the failure of banks during
the Chicago panic of June 1932 was due to common shocks, and Calomiris and Mason
(2001) find that banking problems during the Great Depression can be explained based
upon either bank-specific variables or publicly observable national and regional variables
rather than contagion.
The problem of financial runs can potentially explain regional financial crises as well.
Adverse information can cause lenders to be reluctant to extend credit, and owing to
the externality in providing capital, this can potentially lead to a collapse. Chari and
Kehoe (2003) model international financial crises as informational runs. The model of
Teoh (1997) suggests that intransparency can in principle have the desirable effect of
preventing crises.
33There is also evidence of contagion in speculative attacks on national currencies (Eichengreen, Rose,
and Wyplosz (1996)).
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8.3 Exploiting Herding and Cascades
Firms often market experience goods by offering low introductory prices. In cascades
theory, the low price induces early adoptions, which helps start a positive cascade.
Welch (1992) developed this idea to explain why initial public offerings of equity are
on average severely underpriced by issuing firms. The pricing decision for the Microsoft
IPO seems to have reflected this consideration (Uttal (1986) (p. 32)), and later authors
have provided supporting evidence (Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2003)).
The advantages of inducing information cascades may apply to auctions of other
goods. In the model of Neeman and Orosel (1999), there is a potential winner’s curse,
and a seller (such as a firm selling assets) can gain from approaching potential buy-
ers sequentially and inducing information cascades, rather than conducting an English
auction.
9 Markets, Equilibrium Prices, and Bubbles
In classical models of asset markets such as the CAPM, investors are rational, and mar-
kets are perfect and competitive. There is complete agreement about probability distri-
butions of exogenous variables, which are common knowledge. As a result, risk-adjusted
returns are unpredictable. Furthermore, in a classical market there is no excess volatility,
if by this term we mean some faulty processing of information by the market which cre-
ates opportunities for abnormal trading profits. So fully rational and frictionless models
of cascades or herding cannot explain anomalous evidence regarding return predictabil-
ity or excess volatility based upon public information (for recent surveys of theory and
evidence on investor psychology in capital markets, see, e.g., Hirshleifer (2001), Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002)). To explain return patterns that are anomalous for classical
models, market frictions or imperfect rationality are needed.34
However, information blockages and herding can still affect prices. For example, in
the model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), the common knowledge assumption is
violated, and arbitrageurs who seek to profit from the end of a bubble are not sure
when other arbitrageurs will start to sell. Arbitrageurs may use a public news event to
synchronize, causing the bubble to burst.
Within a fully rational setting (and with common knowledge about probability dis-
tributions), cascades or herding can block information aggregation. Cascades or herding
34In rational expectations models of information and securities trading, returns are predictable owing
to so-called noise or liquidity trading. But limited amounts of non-contingent liquidity trading will not
explain major bubbles and crashes.
34
can affect how much information gets into that information set in two ways. First, there
can be direct cascades in investor trading, causing some information to remain private
which otherwise would be reflected in prices. We discuss below some models in which
this occurs because of market imperfections. Second, even if markets are perfect, cas-
cades or herding can cause individuals to cascade in their investigation behavior, which
affects the amount of private and public information that is generated in the first place.
For example, if individuals cascade in subscribing or not subscribing to a stock mar-
ket newsletter, then the effect of this on the distribution of private information across
investors affects trading and prices.
An intuition similar to the intuition of cascades or herding models with exogenous
action cost can be extended to the issue of how quickly investors learn in competitive
securities markets. In cascades and other learning models, the past history of informa-
tive actions creates an information pool that can crowd out the accumulation of new
information, because new decisionmakers have insufficient incentive to take informative
actions. Even in a market setting without cascades, an informed trader does not in-
ternalize the benefit that other traders have from learning his private information as
revealed through trading. As more private information is reflected in price, informed
traders have diminishing incentive to trade speculatively against the market price (set-
ting aside any change in the riskiness of speculative trading). If informed traders trade
less, their trades tend to be lost amidst uninformative trades, reducing the aggregation
of their information into market price. Thus, the rate of convergence of price to efficiency
can slow down over time (Vives (1995)).35
In settings without technological externalities, market interactions typically lead to
dispersing (anti-herding), because the attempt to acquire a resource makes it more costly
for others to do so.36 Consider, for example, competition among demanders in the
market for bread. If one individual’s demand increases and he buys more, that drives up
the price, which causes others to reduce their demand quantities. Such pressure against
herding supports market clearing. As consumers try to buy more, price rises to constrain
purchases to the available supply.
A similar effect operates in the market for a security. The tendency to imitate past
35An opposing effect is that as price becomes more efficient, risk is reduced, which encourages informed
traders to trade more aggressively. However, when trading occurs through market orders, noise trading
creates an irreducible price risk for informed traders. Thus, Vives finds that market learning slows when
trading occurs through submission of market orders but not when it occurs through submission of limit
orders.
36There is a growing literature on externalities as a source of herding, as in work on strategic com-
plementarities (Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989)) and on agglomeration economies (Krugman and
Venables (1995, 1996)).
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trades is limited by the fact that past trades tend to drive prices to be adverse to further
trades in the same direction. Nevertheless, under asymmetric information there are
circumstances under which cascades or other forms of herding occur.
In a setting with asymmetric information, social learning, and a perfectly liquid
securities market, the basic argument for why cascades of trading will not form is still
fairly direct. If at a given price an individual were going to buy (for example) regardless
of his information signal, a rational seller who understands this would charge a higher
price. For this reason, even in a securities market model where the action space is
discrete and there there are transactions costs, such as that of Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), the argument implies that there will be no information cascades.
To see this in more detail, consider the market clearing condition. If privately in-
formed traders were buying regardless of their signals, then a fortiori so would unin-
formed traders; having no signal encourages buying more than having an adverse signal.
But if, foreseeably, both informed and uninformed will try to buy, then (the argument
goes) the marketmaker should set prices higher, a contradiction. Indeed, some experi-
mental tests in a simple Glosten/Milgrom setting do not yield cascades.37
There are three main snags with the argument against direct cascades in trading
decisions. First is that special constraints may prevent prices from adjusting. Second is
that the party on the opposite side of the transaction (call it the ‘market maker’) may
not know for sure that the investor is going to buy regardless of his signal. The third
is that owing to transactions costs, an individual may refrain from trading regardless of
his signal, which blocks information aggregation.
With respect to the first snag, there are special circumstances in which non-market-
clearing prices are imposed. In the short run, the expectation that NYSE specialists
will maintain an ‘orderly market’ by keeping prices continuous can force temporary
deviations of prices from fundamental values, blocking information flow. This suggests
that during extreme market periods such as crashes, cascades can form. Sometimes
prices are explicitly constrained by price move limits. This permits cascades in which
all investors try to buy (or all sell), resulting in non-trading.
The second problem with the argument against direct trading cascades is that the
party on the opposite side of the transaction (call it the ‘market maker’) may not know
for sure that the investor is going to buy regardless of his signal. We will first discuss
how this can lead to what we will call quasi-cascades. We then discuss how cascades
37See Cipriani and Guarino (2005) and Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005). On the other
hand, other experimental evidence suggests that market settings do not solve the problem of inefficient
information aggregation (Hey and Morone (2004)).
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proper can occur.
It is standard to assume that informed investors know more than the market maker
about a single dimension of uncertainty, the expected payoff of the security. Suppose
that in addition there is a second type of informational advantage to informed investors
over the market maker—knowledge about whether informative signals were sent. Then
a price rise can encourage an investor with an adverse signal to buy when there is a
transaction cost or bid-ask spread (Avery and Zemsky (1998)). The price rise persuades
the investor that others possess favorable information, whereas the market maker adjusts
prices sluggishly in response to this good news.
This relative sluggishness of the marketmaker arises results from his ignorance over
whether an informative signal was sent. Informed traders—even those with adverse
signals—at least know that information signals were sent, so that the previous order
probably came from a favorably informed trader. In contrast, the market maker places
greater weight on the possibility of a liquidity trade.
The behavior described by Avery and Zemsky is very cascade-like, in that the indi-
vidual trades in opposition to his private signal—a rather extreme behavioral coarsening.
However, it is not strictly an information cascade, because when no information signal is
received, the investor takes a different action from when information is received. There
are really three possible signal realizations—favorable, unfavorable, and ‘no signal’. Ac-
tion does depend on the value of this appropriately redefined signal. Still, the result is
a quasi-cascading phenomenon with partial information blockage.38
The third snag with the argument against cascades in trading decisions is that trans-
action costs can easily cause cascades of non-trading. Bid-ask spreads or other transac-
tions costs, by deterring trade, can block information flow. In the model of Cipriani and
Guarino (2007), transactions costs cause cascades of non-trading which block informa-
tion aggregation and cause prices to deviate from full-information fundamental value.
Cipriani and Guarino (2007) also provide experimental support for the predictions of
their model.
38Private information about the existence or quality of private signals (i.e., multiple dimensions of
uncertainty) can also lead to information blockages in which learning about precision stops (Gervais
(1996)). In the model of Gervais (1996), owing to uncertainty about investors
,
information precision,
trader private information is not fully incorporated into price. Informed investors know the precision
of their private signal, but the market-maker does not. Initially a high bid-ask spread acts as a filter
by deterring trade by informed investors unless they have high precision. By observing whether trade
occurs, the market-maker updates about signal precision and asset value, and narrows the spread over
time. Eventually even investors with imprecise signals trade, and the market-maker stops learning
about precision. The independence of the decision to trade of the private information about precision
is a behavioral coarsening, and causes some information about the insiders’ precision to remain forever
private.
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Cipriani and Guarino (2003) provide a modified version of Glosten/Milgrom with
multiple securities. Starting with a single security intuition, the trading of informed
investors causes information to be partly reflected in price. At some point, as price
becomes more informative, having one more conditionally independent private signal
causes an investor to update expected fundamental value only modestly. So an investor
who has a non-speculative reason to purchase the security finds it profitable to buy
even if his private information signal is adverse, and similarly an investor who has a
non-speculative motive to sell does so regardless of his signal. In other words, he is in
a cascade. With all informed investors in a cascade, further aggregation of information
is completely blocked. Thus, in contrast to Avery and Zemsky, information cascades
proper form. Furthermore, cascades can result from contagion across markets; trading
in one asset can trigger a cascade in another market. Furthermore, cascades can occur
in both markets at the same time, leading to complete information blockage.
In Lee (1998), quasi-cascades result in temporary information blockage, then infor-
mation avalanches. This results from transactions costs and discreteness in trades, which
can cause informed investors to be sidelined. In sequential trading, hidden information
becomes accumulated as the market reaches a point at which, owing to transactions
costs, trading temporarily ceases. Eventually a large amount of private information can
be revealed by a small triggering event. The triggering event is a rare, low probability
adverse signal realization. An individual who draws this signal value sells. Other in-
dividuals who observe this sale are drawn into the market, causing a market crash or
information avalanche.39
A key issue regarding the occurrence of information blockage in these models is the
significance of the assumption of discrete actions. Any model that attempts to explain
empirical phenomena such as market crashes as (quasi-)cascades must calibrate with
respect to the size of minimum trade size or price movements. Such constraints are
most likely to be more significant in markets that are less liquid.
Perhaps the more important role of cascades is likely to be in the decision of whether
or not to participate at all, rather than in the decision of whether to buy or sell at
a particular price. If there is a fixed setup cost (perhaps psychic) of participating,
then there can be a substantial discreteness to individual decisions that does not rely
upon limiting the size of trades to a single unit. Cascades of participation versus non-
participation may have important pricing effects.
39Romano (2007) further explores conditions under which transactions costs lead to trading cascades.
When investors are risk averse and action choices are discrete, even with endogenous price, cascades
proper form (De´camps and Lovo (2006)).
38
Some of the most important puzzles in finance involve failures of investors to par-
ticipate in asset classes. For example, there is the puzzle of insufficient participation in
equity markets, and the preference for participating in the markets for local and famil-
iar stocks, which includes the home bias.40 The phenomenon of underpriced neglected
stocks (which is exogenous in the model of Merton (1987)) can also be viewed as a puzzle
of non-participation.
Cascades within a purely rational setting offer a partial explanation. Suppose that
investors are more likely to interact and observe the behavior of other investors in the
same income class than those in different income classes. If a group of low income
investors do not invest in the stock market (possibly for historical reasons, or because
some are deterred by fixed costs of participation), their choices can trigger a cascade of
non-participation. Similarly, if investors in a locality observe (or discuss) each other’s
investment choices, and if some individuals invest locally (for historical or informational
reasons), this can trigger a cascade of local investment.
Such arguments may require greater fleshing out to provide a complete explanation
for the puzzles, since rationally an investor should draw inferences from what investors
in other groups are doing. For example, even if one’s peers are not investing in the
stock market, there is also information to be gleaned from the fairly obvious fact that
someone else is. Of course, an individual may believe that the benefits of stock investing
are heterogeneous, and that his own benefits are more similar to those of his peers than
the non-peers who are making different choices.
Psychological biases can reinforce the effects of rational social learning, which may
help explain cascades of non-participation. For example, suppose that some individu-
als irrationally fear and avoid unfamiliar stocks. Then other investors who observe low
participation in such stocks may draw adverse inferences about the benefits of participa-
tion, causing a cascade. This occurs if investors draw such inferences in a quasi-rational
fashions that fails to adjust for the irrationality of others. More generally, cascades in
market participation offer a rich avenue for theoretical analysis. For example, fragility
in cascades of participation may help explain bubbles and crashes in stocks or portfolios.
There is starting to be some exploration of how the decisions of individuals over time
40Huberman (2001) provides evidence and insightful discussion indicating that individuals prefer
to invest in familiar stocks; Cao, Han, Hirshleifer, and Zhang (2008) model the effects of familiarity
on economic decisions and capital markets. There is also evidence of local preferences in investment
for both institutional investors (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)), who achieve better performance on
local investments (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)); and individual investors (Zhu (2003)), Ivkovich and
Weisbenner (2005)) who in some studies do (Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2005)) and in others do not
(Zhu (2003), Seasholes and Zhu (2005)). On the home bias puzzle of international finance, see, Tesar
and Werner (1995), Lewis (1999)).
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as to whether or not to participate in trading causes information blockages to form and
clear.41 In settings with limited participation, large crashes can be triggered by minimal
information, and the sidelining and entry of investors can cause skewness and volatility
to vary conditional upon past price moves.
The use of the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman (1973)) and the mere
exposure effect (Moreland and Beach (1992)), should also affect participation in markets
and the amount of buzz about or neglect of a stock. Using the availability heuristic,
people judge how common something is by how easy it is to retrieve or imagine examples
of it. Among other things, this causes vivid case examples to be too persuasive of the
truth of a proposition. The mere exposure effect is the tendency for people to like things
more that they have been exposed to.
In the context of risk regulation, Kuran and Sunstein (1999) develop the notion of
availability cascades, in which social processes together with availability bias make a
belief or behavior self-reinforcing. Kuran and Sunstein (p. 683) define an availability
cascade as “a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed
perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility
through its rising availability in public discourse.” Availability cascades can result either
from information cascades, reputational effects, or a combination of the two.
Availability cascades offer a possible explanation for security market bubbles and
waves of corporate events. High favorable publicity about a firm or market theory makes
supportive positive arguments more salient and ‘available’ to investors. Furthermore,
mere exposure should also make the firm or transaction more familiar and therefore
more appealing. Such effects make enthusiasm for investment self-reinforcing. The
phenomenon of hot versus cold IPOs, and of sudden excitement at different times about
types of transactions (hostile takeovers; LBOs; asset backed securities, and so forth)
seem to be availability cascades.
Popular allegations that securities market are irrational often emphasize the conta-
giousness of emotions such as panic or frenzy. Critics often go on to argue that this
causes excess volatility, destabilizes markets, and makes financial system fragile (see,
e.g., the critical review of Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) and references therein).
There is indeed evidence that the contagious spread of emotions affects perceptions and
behavior (see, e.g., Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1993), Barsade (2002)).
Prevailing models of capital market trading and equilibrium are quite limited in the
forms of social influence and information transmission that they accommodate. This
41See Romer (1993), Lee (1998), Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002), and Hong and Stein (2003).
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applies both to classical models of information and securities markets such as Grossman
and Stiglitz (1976), Kyle (1985), and most of the work reviewed here on cascades and
herding in capital markets.
The first premise is that the beliefs and behavior of an investor affects others only
through market price.42 This is perhaps most easily seen in the ‘rational expectations’
approach of Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), wherein uninformed investors observe the
market price, draw an inference from that price about the beliefs of informed traders,
and trade based upon their resulting belief.
The second premise is there is no localization in the influence of an investor on
others. This rules out conversation with neighbors within a social network (which could
be organized geographically or in other ways), and in which media may have influential
nodes.
The evidence discussed in Section 8 suggests that social interactions between individ-
uals affect financial decisions, which suggests that the social or geographical localization
of information may be an important part of the process by which trading behaviors
spread. Furthermore, there are often strategic complementarities or threshold effects
in social processes, wherein the adoption of a belief or behavior by a critical number
of individuals leads to a tipping in favor of one behavior versus another (Granovetter
(1978), Schelling (1978), Kuran (1989, 1998)).
Thus, an important direction for further empirical research is to examine how and
whether a localized process of contagion of beliefs and attitudes affects stock markets
(see, e.g., Shiller (2000a)), and whether securities market price patterns are consistent
with rational models of contagion. Shive (2008) finds that ‘socially motivated trades’
42In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and its generalizations (consumption CAPM, intertem-
poral CAPM), beliefs are exogenous (specifically, individuals are assumed to assess the probability dis-
tribution of variables correctly conditional upon all publicly available information), and investors form
demands for securities by individual optimization taking market prices as given. In consequence, an
investor
,
s behavior (considering different possible out-of-equilibrium choices) affects other investors only
through the effect of that behavior on market price. In other words, just as in the standard economic
theory of supply and demand, equilibrium is mediated by market price.
In models of information and securities markets (Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), Kyle (1985)), the market clearing mechanisms by which trades are converted into prices are
somewhat different, but interactions between investors are still mediated by price.
In Kyle (1985), a competitive market maker quotes a pricing function that fixes the price of the
security as a function of aggregate demand. Investors submit demand quantities, and their orders are
fulfilled at a price determined by the pricing function. So one investor affects another solely through
the effect of his order on price (via the pricing function).
In Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the market maker sets a bid-ask spread, and each investor (who can
be either informed or uninformed) submits a buy or sell order which is executed at the pre-specified
price. An investor is affected by the previous actions of other investors solely through the effect of those
actions on bid-ask prices.
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(as measured based on the predictive power of an epidemiological model) predict future
returns, and that this effect does not reverse out; this suggests that such trading helps
aggregate meaningful information.
An important direction for future theoretical research is to examine the implications
for securities market trading, participation, and prices of conversation between individ-
uals; see, e.g., DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2001) and Ozsoylev (2005). DeMarzo,
Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) provide a general analysis of the effects of persuasion bias
in social networks. Individuals do not adjust appropriately for the fact that the informa-
tion they receive from others may have come from a single common source. Individuals
who have more connections in the social network have a stronger influence on beliefs in
the network (even if their information is not more accurate).
Ozsoylev (2005) provides a model in which investors learn by observing the signals of
other investors to which they are linked within a social network. Investors who belong
to a relatively tightly integrated social cluster have relatively high correlation in their
investment positions. Furthermore, although investors are rational, those who have
many social network connections have a stronger influence on asset prices than those
with fewer connections.
Agency-induced herding by investment managers, such as reputational effects, can
also create mispricing (Brennan (1993), Dasgupta and Prat (2005)). Brennan (1993)
analyzes the asset pricing implications of index-herding behavior. Any price effects of
herding caused by agency problems should be driven by the behavior of institutional
investors. Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2005) test their model prediction that the
reputation return premium increases with the past trades of career-driven traders, and
find that buying by such traders predicts return underperformance, and selling predicts
overperformance. There is evidence suggesting that institutional investors are a source
of positive portfolio return serial correlations (both own-and cross correlations of the
securities held by institutions); see Sias and Starks (1997). There is also evidence that
the autocorrelation of the returns of emerging stock markets increased sharply at the time
that institutional investors were expanding their positions in emerging markets (Aitken
(1998)). Aitken argues that this indicates that this reflected the effect of fluctuating
sentiment by institutional investors.43
There is a substantial literature on contagion between the debt or equity markets of
43Christie and Huang (1995) are unable to detect ‘herd behavior,’ which they define as high cross-
sectional standard deviations of security returns at the time of large price movements. This definition
differs from ours (social interactions that cause behavior to converge). See also Chang, Cheng, and
Khorana (2000) and Richards (1999).
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different nations (see, e.g., Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001)). Borensztein and Gelos
(2003) report moderate correlation in the trades of emerging market mutual funds during
1996-9; correlation was not stronger during crises than normal times. With regard to
price effects of herding, there are some large correlations in returns, but it is hard to
measure whether this is an effect of herding, and there is only mixed evidence as to
whether correlations are higher during financial crises.44 Many studies have examined
how the occurrence of a crisis in one country affects the probability of crisis in another
country (Berg and Pattillo (1999) review this research).
Experimental asset markets have been found to be capable of aggregating a great
deal of the private information of participants; however, in complex environments the
literature has found that blockages form so that information aggregation is imperfect.45
Experimental laboratory research (see, e.g., Cipriani and Guarino (2007)) and field ex-
periments (see Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007), who test for cascades among financial
market professionals on the Chicago Board of Trade) are promising ways of testing how
cascades and herding affect information aggregation in markets, and will offer important
directions for improving theories of financial herding.
There is some evidence suggesting that correlated sentiment on the part of investors
for certain kinds of real assets moves prices for non-fundamental reasons. Gompers
and Lerner (2000) provide evidence of ‘money chasing deals’ in venture capital. Inflows
into venture capital funds are associated with higher valuations of the new investments
made by these funds, but not with the ultimate success of the firms. However, Froot,
O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001) find that portfolio flows in and out of 44 countries during
1994-98 were positive forecasters of future equity returns, with statistical significance in
emerging markets.
10 Cascades and Herding in Firm Behavior
It is often alleged in the popular press that managers are foolishly prone to fads in
management methods (for examples and formal analysis see Strang and Macy (2001)),
investment choices, and disclosure or reporting practices. We first consider investment
and financing choices, and then disclosure and reporting.
44Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) provide strong evidence of trading convergence among foreign investors
before the 1996-7 period of economic crisis for Korea, but convergence was actually lower during the
crisis period. Furthermore, they do not find any indication that trades by foreign investors had a
destabilizing effect on Korea’s stock market.
45See, e.g., Noeth et al (2002), Bloomfield and Libby (1996), and the surveys of Libby, Bloomfield,
and Nelson (2002) and Sunder (1995)).
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10.1 Investment and Financing Decisions
Managers learn by observing the actions and performance of other managers, both within
and across firms. This suggests that firms will engage in herding and be subject to infor-
mation cascades, leading to management fads in accounting, financing and investment
decisions. We have already discussed models of social learning and investment deci-
sions.46
As for stylized facts, the popularity of different investment valuation methods, secu-
rities to issue, and so on have certainly waxed and waned. There are booms and quiet
periods in new issues of equity that are related to past stock market returns and to the
past average initial returns from buying an IPO (see, e.g., Eckbo and Masulis (1995),
Lowry and Schwert (2002), Ritter and Welch (2002), and Rau and Stouraitis (2008)).
However, it is not easy to test whether fluctuations in investments and strategies are the
result of irrationality, rational but imperfect aggregation of private information signals,
or direct responses to fluctuations in public observables.
Takeover markets have been subject to seemingly idiosyncratic booms and busts of
enormous scale, such as the wave of conglomerate mergers in the 1960’s and 70’s, in which
firms diversified across different industries, the subsequent refocusing of firms through
restructuring and bustup takeovers in the 1980’s, followed by the merger boom of the
1990s. Targets of a takeover bid are ‘put into play,’ and often quickly receive competing
offers, despite the negative cost externality of having a competitor. A distinct kind of
evidence suggesting that the decision to engage in a takeover is contagious is that within
a 1981-90 sample, a firm was more likely to merge if one of its top managers was a
director of another firm that had engaged in a merger during the preceding three years
(Haunschild (1993)).
Several studies test for herd behavior in corporate investment decisions. This raises
the question of whether there is a general tendency toward strategic imitation.47 Survey
evidence on Japanese firms indicates that a factor that encourages firms to engage in
direct investment in an emerging economy in Asia is whether other firms are investing
in that country. This is consistent with possible cascading based upon a manager’s
46In addition, a growing literature analyzes how rates of learning vary during macroeconomic fluctua-
tions and how the learning process causes booms and crashes in levels of investment (see, e.g., Gonzalez
(1997), Chalkley and Lee (1998), Chamley (1999), Veldkamp (2000)).
47Jain and Gupta (1987) report only weak evidence of herding in loans to LDC’s by US banks.
D’Arcy and Oh (1997) study cascades in the decisions of insurers to underwrite risks and the pricing of
insurance. Foresi, Hamao, and Mei (1998) provide evidence consistent with imitation in the investment
decisions of Japanese firms. Greve (1998) provide evidence of firm imitation in the choice of new radio
formats in the U.S.. Kedia and Rajgopal (2006) find geographical clustering in the decision by firms to
use option compensation for rank and file workers.
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perception that rival firms possess useful private information about the desirability of
such investment (Kinoshita and Mody (2001)). Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) examined
the relation amongst the investments of 24 chemical products over two decades. They
found that larger firms in an industry tend to invest when their rivals do not. In contrast,
smaller firms tend to be followers in investment. This behavior is consistent with the
‘fashion leader’ version of the cascades model (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1992)) in which the less precise free-ride informationally on the more precise (if large
firms have greater absolute benefit from acquiring precise information, or if there are
scale economies in information acquisition).
A natural way of identifying possible herding, in the spirit of the animal behavior
that gave herding its name, is to test for geographical clustering. Chaudhuri, Chang,
and Jayaratne (1997) provide evidence of spatial clustering of bank branches in cities.
They find that a bank’s decision to open a new branch in a census tract of New York
City during 1990-95 was increasing in the number of existing branches in that tract after
controlling for profitability proxies.
Analogous to the endorsement effect in individual investor trading are endorsement
effects in real investments. There are certainly examples in which investors act soon
after others make their decisions. However, especially since there are likely to be payoff
externalities, it is important to examine case examples carefully to evaluate whether
investors are really imitating each other. Real estate investment is a natural field of ap-
plication for cascades/endorsement effects, because the investment decisions are discrete
and conspicuous (Caplin and Leahy (1998) analyze real estate herding/cascading).
Economists have long studied agglomeration economies as an explanation for ge-
ographical concentration of investment and economic activity (e.g., Marshall (1920),
Krugman and Venables (1995, 1996)). Such effects are surely important. However,
as pointed out by DeCoster and Strange (1993), geographical concentration can occur
without agglomeration economies owing to learning by observation of others: ‘spurious
agglomeration.’ Empirically, some papers use previous investment by other firms in a
location as a proxy for agglomeration economies in predicting investment by other firms
(e.g., Head, Ries and Swenson (1995, 2000)). Barry, Go¨rg, and Strobl (2004) test be-
tween agglomeration economies and what they call ‘demonstration effects,’ whereby a
firm locates in a host country because the presence of other firms there provides infor-
mation about the attractiveness of the host country. They conclude that both effects
are important.
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10.2 Disclosure and Reporting Decisions
Since investors make comparisons in evaluating firms, the disclosure and reporting prac-
tices of one firm impose externalities upon others. This point is reinforced by the like-
lihood that the voluntary disclosure/reporting practices chosen by firms help establish
informal standards for other firms (though such practices are also, of course, subject to
regulation).
Disclosure and reporting practices vary over time. For example, in recent years it
has been popular for U.S. firms to disclose pro forma earnings in ways that differ from
the GAAP-permitted definitions on firms’ financial reports. Regulators have expressed
concern about this practice, but firms argue that this allows them to reflect better long-
term profitability by adjusting for non-recurring items. It is also possible that firms are
just herding, or exploiting herd behavior by investors.
Surprisingly, Pincus and Wasley (1994) report that voluntary accounting changes
by firms do not appear to be clustered in time and industry, suggesting no herding
behavior in accounting changes. This result further suggests that firms do not switch
accounting methods in response to changes in macro-economic investment conditions
that are experienced at about the same time by similar firms within an industry. Rather,
the voluntary accounting changes would appear to be made in response to firm-specific
needs, such as a firm-specific need to manage earnings.
However, it is not obvious why firms would manage earnings in response to firm-
specific but not common factor shocks. One speculative possibility is that there is a
concern for relative performance, as reflected in the model of Zwiebel (1995), combined
with some deviation from perfect rationality that causes investors to adjust imperfectly
for accounting method in evaluating firms’ earnings.48 The concern for relative perfor-
mance may create a stronger incentive for managers to manage earnings upward when
the firm is doing poorly relative to peers than when the entire industry is doing poorly.49
Geographical proximity does affect reporting practices. Kedia and Rajgopal (2008)
find that the accounting practices of neighboring firms are correlated with the likelihood
that a firm misreports accounting items resulting in accounting restatements. Presum-
48For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) suggest that owing to limited attention, investors
are too credulous in the sense of failing to adjust for the interested motives of firms, and that this
explains actions such as issuing equity or of failing to disclose information. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh
(2004) provide a model of how informed parties adjust their disclosure decisions to exploit the limited
attention of observers.
49Consistent with this idea, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) provide evidence that the likelihood
of hostile takeover forcing managerial turnover was high for firms underperforming their industry, but
was not high when the industry as a whole was underperforming.
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ably this is because managers of firms in close proximity presumably interact and share
information about their accounting practices. One would expect such an effect to be
strongly in gray areas that could result in eventual restatement.
Furthermore, Kedia and Rajgopal (2008) find that counties that are farther from SEC
regional offices have a higher frequency of income-decreasing restatements, and Defond,
Francis, and Hu (2008) find that distance from SEC regional offices affect the likelihood
of severe problems, SEC enforcement actions, and consequently the quality of the auditor
and the financial statements. To the extent that word-of-mouth communication among
auditors, managers, and regulators is localized, we expect a greater chance that parties to
potential misreporting leak information about questionable practices leaks to regulators
when enforcement offices are close.
Option backdating affects the way that compensation levels are reported to investors.
Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2007) find that option backdating seems to spread con-
tagiously through interlocked boards of directors, auditor links, and are also affected by
geographical proximity. This suggests that word-of-mouth discussion between managers
and directors spreads corporate behaviors.
11 Contagion of Financial Memes
Standard rational and behavioral models of information in capital markets usually focus
on simple signals and signal processing (often using univariate signals with normal or
binary distributions, and Bayesian or quasi-Bayesian updating). Such modeling does
not capture the way that people accept or rule out arguments based upon chains of
reasoning, triggered associations, and emotional reactions. So most existing information
models say little about how thoughts and beliefs about firms or capital markets spread
from person to person.
In reality, investors use verbal ‘reasons’ to decide how to trade, and these reasons are
often not cogent. Barber, Heath, and Odean (2003) find that individual investors and
their investment clubs tend to buy stocks for which plausible reasons are available (such
as a firm being on a media list of most admired companies). This is despite the fact
that the reasons examined do not predict superior trading performance. These reasons
seem to be spread by social interaction; stock clubs favor such stocks more strongly than
individuals.
Reasons, or financial memes (units of cultural replication, as defined in the intro-
duction) can be simple (‘buy on the dips’), or can be elaborate structures of analysis,
examples, terminology, catchphrases, and modeling (e.g., portfolio theory). The conta-
47
gion of such memes, their effects on markets, and (more ambitiously) how combinations
of memes evolve as they move from person to person, are the subjects of a missing
chapter in financial theory.
Leading the charge, Robert Shiller and coauthors have discussed and provided survey
evidence about ‘popular models’ during bubbles in securities and real estate markets (see
footnote 2).50 We use the terms ‘popular idea’ or meme to refer to thoughts where there
is no presumption as to whether carriers hold the thoughts because of some supporting
theory or analysis.
For example, Shiller, Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui (1996) find during the late 1980’s to early
1990’s that U.S. investors were much more prone to viewing the Japanese stock market
as overpriced than did Japanese investors, and that the popularity of this meme among
Japanese investors followed market movements. They also report that a substantial
fraction of investors viewed the market as overpriced but recommended staying in the
market because it was going to go up before it falls—a viewpoint which lends itself to the
formation of bubbles. There is need for much more theoretical and empirical research
about what affects the popularity of the ‘The market is overpriced (underpriced)’ and
the ‘The market is rising (falling)’ memes.
Case and Shiller (1989, 2003) find that real estate investors in ‘glamour cities’ have
unrealistic beliefs about the risk and expected appreciation of residential housing, and
that these beliefs seem to come from ‘simplistic theories’ that are more prevalent in
glamour cities than in a non-glamour city (Milwaukee). One such meme is the idea that
more desirable real estate tends to appreciate more rapidly. Case and Shiller (2003, p.
325) propose that this is because people ‘confuse the level of prices with the rate of
change.’ Evidently people do not understand the efficient markets notion that prices ad-
50See also Lynch (2000) for intriguing discussion. The phrase ‘popular model,’ implicitly connotes
some metaphor, analysis or theory of mechanism on the part of investors (even if a superficial or
erroneous one). Certainly the appeal of some popular ideas comes from a justifying mechanism or story.
For example, the idea, “No one ever became a billionaire holding a diversified portfolio,” contains both
investment advice and a simple justifying explanation. However, ideas can become popular even when
the carriers lack any clear conception of mechanism at all. Such ideas are popular because of some
inherent attractiveness of the idea (or some expression of it), or simply because the high prevalence of
the idea makes it psychologically available and self-sustaining (just as a celebrity can be ‘famous for
being famous’).
For example, the popular idea that during a stock market boom, investors become greedy does
not seem to be based on any explanation for why greed shifts (we are not aware of any general folk
psychology view that when people receive good news they become greedier). The popularity of the idea
probably comes from observation of seemingly overaggressive behavior by speculators during a boom
period. Rather than thinking through some model of social dynamics during a boom, it is cognitively
easier to simply attribute the change in investors’ behavior to a change in their internal mental state
(greater greed). (Over-attribution of behaviors to personal dispositions is known as the fundamental
attribution error; Jones and Harris (1967), Nisbett and Ross (1980).)
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just immediately to reflect differences in attractiveness. Their survey evidence supports
this. Another fallacy is the idea that when housing is scarce, price becomes irrelevant.
Shiller (2007b) suggests that the 1970s boom in U.S. farmland prices may have been
due to the ‘great population scare,’ of the 1970s, which was associated with widespread
media attention devoted to forecasts of mass starvation and global exhaustion of re-
sources. This meme seems to have been reinforced by the popular idea that since the
amount land is finite, as population rises and people use space to live, inevitably land
will be permanently lost for cultivation, driving up prices.
Apart from Shiller’s discussions and pioneering surveys, behavioral economics and
finance has focused mainly on the effects of individual psychological biases, and how
individuals interact through buying and selling as mediated by price. The memetic
approach focuses specifically on the social transmission mechanism (e.g., conversation,
or news media communication); a meme can replicate only through information that
is conveyed from one person to another. Furthermore, memetics focuses on the idea’s
ability to hijack the psychological mechanisms of its carriers, much like the way a virus
hijacks cellular mechanisms within the bodies of carriers to replicate itself.
Thus, the memetic approach is not primarily about importing ideas from social
psychology into behavioral finance. It is about how memes exploit the process by which
ideas are stored and replicated. This suggests a different kind of question from those
typically asked in behavioral economics or in social psychology. A standard question
would be, “What are the kinds of biases that individuals are prone to?” Somewhat
closer to memetics is the question, “How do individual biases affect whether people
will be tempted to succumb to some exogenously specified popular idea about financial
markets?” Some less conventional questions are, “What are the characteristics of an idea
(meme) in relation to its environment that help it replicate and predominate within the
population of ideas?”51, and “How do financial ideologies evolve?” Thus, the memetic
perspective suggests different hypotheses, approaches to modeling, and tests.52
51There is a population of people and a population of ideas that people hold. If an idea spreads from
one person to another, it has reproduced, and its frequency within the population of ideas has risen. Of
course, individual psychology (and the answers to the first two questions) are still crucial for answering
memetic questions.
52Of course, a correct memetic understanding must be consistent with a correct psychological un-
derstanding, just as correct biochemistry must be consistent with correct genetics or physics. But the
memetic stance suggests different insights and research questions.
Biological evolution can be viewed as a process that leads to well-adapted genes and organisms
(survival of the fittest), or as a process in which certain forces push gene frequencies in certain directions.
The first stance, the Darwinian or adaptationist one, suggests that evolution can be understood as an
as-if optimization over the possible characteristics a gene or organism might ‘choose’ to have. The
alternative stance focuses on the mechanics and accounting of gene frequencies. Biologists use both
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Several objections have been raised about the memetic approach to cultural evolu-
tion. This is not the place to review these issues, but we will mention that even some
authors who deemphasize the need for replicators (Henrich and Boyd (2002)) still cham-
pion the propositions that natural selection operates on cultural variants, and that this
results in cumulative evolution of culture. The distinction between discrete variants that
are precisely copied, and continuous variants that are approximately copied, seems to
be more technical than substantive. Memetic arguments still work qualitatively with
only trivial rephrasing—there is still adaptiveness and as-if optimization. We replace
the ‘selfish meme’ with the ‘selfish cultural variant’ that behaves almost like a meme.53
types of reasoning, and done correctly the two must be consistent.
Similarly, the memetic (i.e., adaptationist) stance focuses on how selection results in the evolution of
well-adapted cultural variants. This puts the spotlight on the meme metaphorically striving to be fit.
A mechanical stance puts the spotlight on forces that push meme frequencies up or down. So long as
it makes sense to think about adaptiveness, as in the paragraph above, these perspectives are two sides
of the same coin, and must be consistent.
There is also subtle discussion among scientists and philosophers as to how to define ‘replicator.’ Some
leading exponents of applying natural selection arguments to cultural evolution argue that some cultural
representations are not replicators (memes). The problem is that cultural variants may sometimes be
arrayed upon a continuum instead of coming in discrete alternatives, and if there is noise in transmission,
no variant will ever be copied exactly. Boyd and Richerson (2000) accept the existence of memes, use
memetic arguments and develop memetic models. However, they generally use the term ‘cultural
variants’ in order to accommodate both memes and cultural representations that are not replicators.
(A memetic argument suggests to us that this 6-syllable term has little hope of replacing ‘meme’.)
53Henrich and Boyd (2002) provide summary of and reference to some objections to the idea that
natural selection on cultural variants produces cumulative evolution. One is that socially transmitted
representations are sometimes continuous and copied with noise. Another is that mental representations
are transmitted between individuals in a biased fashion. According to this argument, predispositions of
the human mind cause certain mental representations to be strong ‘attractors,’ so that in equilibrium
a few popular ideas become dominant.
Henrich and Boyd (2002) give the concrete example of a continuum of possible beliefs between the
belief, ‘the moon is just a rock,’ and ‘the moon is a god’. Suppose that these two extremes are attractors;
it is easier to think that the moon is a god than to think that it has 2/3 chance of being a god, and
easier to think that it is just a rock than that it has 2/3 chance of being just a rock. So an individual
who is exposed to the idea that the moon is probably just a rock tends to represent the moon as a
rock even more strongly, and if exposed to the idea that the moon probably a god, he tends to believe
this even more strongly. The critics of memetics (and of cultural natural selection) therefore argue that
a few representations (e.g., either the moon as a god, or the moon as a rock) will soon dominate the
population even though cultural variants fall on a continuum, that this dominance is not driven by
natural selection on representations, and that selection does not create cumulative evolution.
A problem with this objection is that having strong attractors effectively discretizes the set of cultural
variants. As shown in the first model of Henrich and Boyd (2002), with strong attractors, the subset
of individuals who start out tending toward a given extreme quickly approach it very closely. Once the
population is polarized, selection between the two extremes becomes important; whichever is favored
by selection dominates in the long run. Boyd and Richerson conclude that even in a scenario without
discrete replicators, cultural selection is important. But this scenario also illustrates that evolution
through selection on discrete memes can be an arbitrarily good approximation of a continuous setting.
Henrich and Boyd (2002) also develop models in which cumulative cultural adaptation occurs when
either discrete or continuous memes are copied inaccurately.
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In terms of modeling, a memetic approach considers shifts in population frequencies,
as in population genetics models and models of disease contagion. The memetic stance
further suggests developing models in which the meme is the (as-if) optimizer, selecting
characteristics that will promote its own reproduction. This is analogous to models of
adaptiveness in evolutionary biology in which genes that have maximal reproductive
success. As discussed earlier, Shive (2008) models and tests the contagion of investment
behaviors through a population, analogous to the spread of a disease. Similarly, Shiller
(2000b) chapter 8 likens the spread of ideas about the stock market to a contagion spread
through conversation. Epidemiological models have also been applied to the spread of
ideas (see Bartholomew (1982)), an approach that could easily be applied to the spread
of an investment idea (e.g., ‘Sell your losers, ride your winners’) as an infection.
Similarly, the rate at which financial ideas replicate in population can be measured.
For example, Shiller (2007a) (discussed further below) measures the rise and fall in
popularity of the concept of the real rate of interest. Natural further memetic questions
are, in what ways are this meme adaptive to its environment? How well does it exploit
the transmission mechanisms that copy ideas from person to person? The answer to this
will depend on the characteristics of this meme and its environment (most notably the
existing population of memes, and the population of people who carry those memes).
For example, the meme is not instantly understandable, which hinders its spread. In
an environment of low and stable inflation, the real/nominal distinction becomes less
useful in daily life, which hinders the meme’s spread. In general, the answers to these
questions explains the evolution of the meme’s frequency.54
Some characteristics that help a meme reproduce include logical cogency, ease of
cognitive processing (portfolio theory would be more popular if it were easy to learn),
and emotional vividness (hence, the popularity of dysfunctional investment memes that
promise ways to ‘get rich quick’). The characteristics of the environment that matter
include the effectiveness of unrelated memes that struggle for attention in people’s minds,
and the cogency or vividness of directly competing memes that oppose the given meme.
For example, the meme, ‘Sell your losers, ride your winners,’ is opposed by the meme,
‘Buy or sell based on expectations, not history.’
A great puzzle in finance is why individual investors trade actively or place money
with actively trading money managers. This effort to beat the market leads to wasted
transactions cost and (if correlated investor sentiment affects price) to subnormal gross
54Berger and Heath (2005) perform several field and experimental laboratory tests of the effects of
‘idea habitat,’ the range of situations in which people have the opportunity to use a meme, on its success
in reproduction.
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returns. Information cascades and memetics can potentially help explain the attractive-
ness of active investing by non-experts. If friends and acquaintances are investing in
an active mutual fund, an individual who learns this but does not observe their return
performance can be in a cascade, and imitate.
Furthermore, a conversational bias helps the meme that ‘Active trading is the road
to exceptional profits,’ survive, despite the damage done to its carriers. People like to
talk about their trading gains more than their losses. This means that in conversation
with acquaintances people hear more about the upside to active trading than the down-
side. If listeners do not discount for this bias, they will overestimate the benefits to
active trading. Such effects should be exacerbated when an individual spends more time
discussing investments, as occurs when an individual participates in an investments chat
room, message board, or investment club.
Biological evolution has led to the development of coadapted teams of genes that
produce organisms. Distin (2004) calls coadapted sets of memes assemblies. Dawkins
(1976) gives the examples of religions, scientific theories, and philosophies. For our
purposes we will refer to financial ideologies, with no intended implication that such
ideologies are either good or bad. For example, the meme ‘dead cat bounce’ is too
simple and disjoint from other financial memes to be an ideology or part of an ideology.
In contrast, the efficient markets hypothesis is a highly elaborated financial ideology
(which happens to have a great deal of validity) supported by arguments, formal models,
statistical evidence, vivid examples, and prestigious proponents.
It is intuitive that valid financial ideologies would develop through cumulative evolu-
tion and prosper, but invalid ideologies also do so. Although the surveys of Shiller and
his coauthors do not focus on distinguishing simple financial memes from assemblies,
their research is a first step toward identifying financial ideologies and devising theories
of how they develop.
To give some hints of the memetic approach, we discuss some speculative examples
of how popular financial ideologies seem to be adaptive (good at spreading themselves).
Shiller (2000b) provides insightful historical review of popular ideologies that developed
and prospered during past market booms. Similar ideas recur over the decades, as
with what Shiller calls ‘New Eras Theories’ of the stock market. It seems that periods
of rising stock prices, which investors observe and seek to explain, provide a salubrious
habitat for the ‘New Era’ ideology which seems to evolve repeatedly and independently.55
55In his chapter 5, entitled ‘New Era Economic Thinking,’ Shiller discusses remarkable parallels
between the turn of the century optimism of 1901, the 1920s optimism, the new era thinking of the
1950s and 1960s, and new era thinking in the 1990s.
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Such repeated evolution of similar ideologies is reminiscent of the repeated independent
biological evolution of behaviors (flight) or organs (the eye). It raises the hope that
the adaptiveness concept (for memes, not people) can help explain cumulative memetic
evolution, just as adaptiveness helps explain genetic evolution.
Memetics is complementary to the notion of availability cascades (see Section 9).
When an environmental shift creates an exceptional opportunity for a meme to spread,
often an availability cascade is triggered. The availability cascade concept focuses on
spasms of activity in public discourse. An area of possible financial application is to bub-
bles and crashes); and to the psychological effects of availability. The field of memetics
concerns all aspects of the evolution of populations of ideas, including both stable evo-
lutionary equilibria and periods of dynamic shifts; and including all psychological forces
that affect the reproduction memes.
The marketing of an IPO can be viewed as a way of trying to trigger an availability
cascade wherein the idea that the company is a good investment suddenly becomes
popular.56 In the dot-com period an availability cascade supported the meme that the
Internet was a uniquely spectacular investment opportunity. This meme was mutually
reinforcing with more specific memes (and availability cascades) about particular dot-
com startups, such as Netscape.
As discussed in Subsection 4.3, in bad times people crave safety, and in good times
opportunity (Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005b)). Mullainathan and Shleifer find that
advertisers adjust their persuasion activities accordingly. More generally, even apart
from the exploitive efforts of sellers, during downturns we expect memes about dan-
ger versus safety to spread in popular discussions, and during upturns memes about
opportunity. The memes that investment clubs or day-trading are ways for individual
investors to achieve exceptional performance became popular during the 1990s, a period
of rising stock prices. This was probably due in part to a self-feeding effect in which
individuals learned from advertising, the media, and word of mouth that many others
were engaged in these activities, and supposedly profiting thereby. The rise and fall of
these practices therefore seem to be availability cascades.
These examples are a kind of micro-evolution of memes in response to changing
market conditions. Perhaps the most basic micro-evolution in financial markets is the
perpetual seesawing contest between bullish and bearish memes. These fluctuate in
response to fundamental news, the rise through mutation of salient new memes (‘The
Internet changes everything’), and emotional factors that influence the public mood.
56Pollock, Rindova, and Maggitti (2008) discuss information cascades and availability cascades in
IPOs.
53
Another example of such microevolution is provided by the wide swings in popularity
of the value ideology versus the growth ideology, the tech boom and bust being the most
spectacular recent example. In good times, it is the most speculative stocks (growth
options) that tend to do the best, which seems to provide evidence in favor of the
growth investing approach. Furthermore, emotionally there is a mood of optimism,
which encourages the pursuit of opportunity. During times of opportunity people want
to feel that they are ‘with it,’ that they ‘get it,’ and are not ‘old fogies’ (a somewhat
old-fogeyish expression).
In contrast, in bad times the evidence from recent returns seems to lend support to the
value ideology. Emotionally, investors seek greater safety. Furthermore, the pessimism
of such times places a higher premium on the virtue of frugality. The emphasis of the
value investing approach on measures of ‘cheapness’ of stocks plays to this. Indeed, the
value ideology provides an emotionally catchy and ego-boosting narrative of folly (by
others, the greedy speculators) and wisdom (by the self, the wise and prudent value
investor). Proponents of value investing often condemn the irresponsible behavior of
previous ‘go-go years.’ The moralistic tone of value investing expositions in the popular
media is striking. This reveals a successful strategy used by the value meme assembly.
Although the value and growth ideologies are subject to microevolution, they also
contain deep wells of appeal which allow them to successfully ride out good times and
bad. It is easy to see how frequency-dependent natural selection might lead to a long-
term equilibrium in which these conflicting ideologies coexist. When there are many
growth investors, growth stocks become overvalued, increasing the subsequent profits
of value investors; greater profits generate more favorable stories which can be passed
on, spreading the ideology. The reverse occurs when there are few growth investors.
A similar reasoning suggests that bullish versus bearish ideologies are self-limiting. In
the language of genetics, we expect a balanced polymorphism. To develop a memetic
understanding of the micro- and macroevolution of these ideologies, research is needed
to understand how they exploit investors’ psychological needs.
Shiller (2007a) emphasizes that changes in popular economic models should be viewed
as central to understanding periods of asset overvaluation. Following Modigliani and
Cohn (1979), he argues that as a result of money illusion on the part of investors, low
nominal interest rates lead to higher valuations of assets. In particular, investors are
currently unaware of the real versus nominal interest rate distinction, and discount at
nominal rates without adjusting forecasts of future dividends for forecasts of inflation.
He documents the historical rise in public references to ‘real interest rates,’ and finds
that recently the use of the phrase has dropped precipitously. He also documents the
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recent rise in popularity of the meme that global markets are ‘awash with liquidity,’ by
performing Lexis-Nexis search of this phrase.
There are also managerial fads, and stable popular theories about management meth-
ods (such as EVA), capital budgeting techniques (e.g., payback versus NPV), and other
aspects of corporate investment and financing policy. As discussed in Subsection 4.3,
there is evidence that some corporate behaviors spread across firms through the inter-
locking social networks of managers and boards. Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller (2007)
model the influence of the ‘get big fast’ ideology about the best strategy for Dot Com
startups to achieve success, and provide evidence suggesting that it resulted in overin-
vestment by existing firms and too little entry. (This ideology was motivated in large
part by the economic theory literature on network externalities and increasing returns.)
They model the adoption of this meme as an information cascade.
The payback criterion is invalid, but decades of explaining its inferiority to NPV
to MBAs have not yet completely stamped it out. As an illustration of the memetic
approach, consider the following speculative explanation. The extreme simplicity of
payback makes it easy to absorb and apply. Furthermore, the ability to use it for quick
back-of-the-envelope calculations has the effect of spreading it. Young managers who see
senior managers using it infer that it is an acceptable (perhaps even preferable) approach.
Valid or not, this simple story illustrates how information cascades and psychological
bias can complement the memetic approach.
Financial ideologies also influence public policy. Hirshleifer (2008) discusses the self-
promoting characteristics of what he calls the ideology of anti-short-termism. He argues
that this is meme assembly combines a number of ideas that are conceptually unrelated
but emotionally linked, and that it is an important driver of financial and accounting
regulation.
12 Conclusion
Observers have long wondered whether sudden large shifts in prices, actions, and re-
source allocation in capital markets are caused by social contagion. Such phenomena
include asset and security market booms and crashes; real investment booms and busts;
takeover and financing waves (including boom/bust patterns in the design of securities,
such as asset backed securities); shifts in disclosure practices (such as the use of pro
forma earnings disclosures; and financial market runs. Often the behaviors of relevant
participants converge despite negative payoff externalities, suggesting that such patterns
may be caused by contagious effects of psychological bias, or by the failure of rational
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social learning to aggregate information efficiently.
We review here the causes and effects of contagion of thoughts and behaviors in cap-
ital markets among participants such as investors, managers, security analysts, advisors,
and media commentators. We examine theory and evidence about how rational obser-
vational learning, agency problems, and psychological forces affect contagion in firms’
investment, financing, and disclosure choices and in investors’ trading decisions; and the
consequences of contagion for the pricing of real assets and securities. In addition to
herding by managers or other agents, we consider how such agents exploit the readiness
of investors to herd.
An externality problem is central to the theory of rational observational learning.
Each individual maximizes his own payoff without regard to the effect of his choice on
the information obtained by later decisionmakers by observing the individual’s action
choice and/or the payoff consequences of that choice. Over time, individuals act mainly
based upon the accumulated inventory of public information (perhaps including pay-
off information) generated by past actions. This delays or blocks the generation and
revelation of further information.
Thus, in a range of economic settings, even if payoffs are independent and people
are rational, decisions tend to converge quickly upon mistaken action choices. In other
words, the resulting cascade or herd is idiosyncratic. Owing to idiosyncrasy, rational
individuals place only modest faith in the conventional action; the cascade or herd is
easily dislodged (fragility). Furthermore, under rational observational learning tends to
cause simultaneity (delay followed by a sudden spasm of joint action), paradoxicality
(increasing the availability of public information by various means can decrease welfare
and decision accuracy), and path dependence (chance early events have big effects on
ultimate outcomes).
Depending on the exact assumptions, information may be completely suppressed for
a period (until a cascade is dislodged). Under other assumptions, no cascades form, and
asymptotically all uncertainty is resolved, but too slowly (relative to full aggregation of
private signals). Information cascades require discrete, bounded, or gapped action space
(or cognitive constraints); these conditions are highly plausible in many investment
settings. Even when these conditions fail, owing to noise, the growth in accuracy of
the public information pool tends to be self-limiting, because an individual who places
heavy weight on the information derived from past actions puts little weight on his own
signal, making his own action less informative to those who follow.
Markets have been praised as marvels of spontaneous information aggregation (Hayek
(1945)). Indeed, we see that rational price-setting in perfect markets encourages in-
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vestors to use their private signals rather than imitating the trades of others, discouraging
direct information cascades of trading. However, in settings with multiple dimensions of
uncertainty, quasi-cascading behavior can occur in which individuals trade in opposition
to their information signals.
Furthermore, transaction costs, minimum trade sizes, or psychological biases can
prevent price from fully aggregating information. As a result, trading cascades proper
can form, including cascades in participation versus non-participation in markets. Even
without frictions or biases, information cascades (and other sources of herd behavior)
in investigation indirectly affect trading and the amount of information aggregated into
market price. So despite some arguments to the contrary, in several economic settings
information cascades affect securities trading and prices.
Although inefficient behaviors can be locked in by non-informational factors (such
as positive payoff externalities), the theory of rational observational learning, and espe-
cially the information cascades theory, differ in their implication of fragility. So payoff
externality models are helpful in explaining herds that seem stable and robust.57 Repu-
tational models, for example, generate stable patterns of herding or dispersing through
endogenously generated payoff externalities. Reputational models help explain when
herding versus dispersing will occur, and offer implications about the effect on the pres-
sure to herd of the career statuses of managers.
We need new models of price setting in financial markets in which beliefs are not
transmitted solely through price, in which ideas spread between neighbors in a social
network, and by means of electronic media. Furthermore, we need analysis that reflects
the fact that the information that is conveyed is not necessarily a simple normally
distributed signal, processed in some rational or quasi-rational fashion. Often what are
conveyed are investment ideas, or memes, and we need to understand how both isolated
financial memes (e.g., ‘This stock is going to rise’) and full-fledged financial ideologies
(such as ‘New Era’ theories, and the value and growth ideologies) spread from person
to person as a sort of social epidemic. Empirical testing will of course be crucial for a
research program based on thought contagion to succeed.
Such a program involves understanding the spread of particular financial memes
viewed as an epidemic, studying what characteristics of financial memes tend to promote
their own replication, and what characteristics of the environment favor different kinds
of memes. In other words, it involves studying what makes some financial memes more
better-adapted than others. Even more ambitiously, it is important to understand why
57However, informational effects including cascades can still occur in settings with payoff externalities,
leading to idiosyncratic (though not fragile) outcomes.
57
certain financial memes complement each other, and how this leads to the cumulative
evolution of financial ideologies that are well-adapted in the sense that they are good at
spreading themselves.
We have suggested that many of the puzzles and anomalies of capital markets can be
understood by going beyond a focus on individual psychological biases and how biased
individuals interact through trading and market price. Instead, as Robert Shiller has
proposed, we need to understand the social processes that lead to the spread of popular
ideas. For dynamic phenomena such as bubbles and crashes, the concept of availability
cascades is especially promising. We have offered some tentative speculative memetic
explanations for such phenomena as the survival of invalid capital budgeting methods
and money-losing active trading strategies, bubbles, hot IPOs, short-run fluctuations
in the profitability of value versus growth strategies and frequencies of the value and
growth ideologies, and long-run coexistence of these ideologies.
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